Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell execution that modifies the 'jquery.mousewheel-3.0.6.pack.js' file while simultaneously attempting to timestomp file metadata or utilizing specific obfuscation markers identified in webshell deployment patterns.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
This rule detects instances where a process matching a known sideload-vulnerable binary (such as werfaultsecure or wuauclt) spawns a PowerShell process that executes commands commonly used for Active Directory reconnaissance and system information discovery. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, specifically reconnaissance phases performed by malware loaders like Lorem Ipsum.
Detects the creation of web scripts (aspx, php, jsp) in typical web server directories followed by suspicious shell activity (cmd, powershell, or shell execution) originating from web server processes within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a web shell being dropped and subsequently utilized for command execution.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the insertion of a PowerShell download cradle command into the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key. This activity is indicative of the 'ClickFix' technique, where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog box.
Detects instances where the Microsoft Edge proxy process (msedge_proxy.exe) initiates command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This behavior is highly suspicious as a browser-related process should not typically be spawning shell interpreters, potentially indicating exploitation of browser vulnerabilities or malicious script execution.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) launched directly from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox). The rule specifically flags common obfuscation techniques such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or attempts to download and execute code (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) while excluding explicit file-based script executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is instructed to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog. The rule triggers on PowerShell being launched from explorer.exe with 'ExecutionPolicy Bypass', utilizing 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) to download content, and saving it to the user's TEMP directory via 'Out-File' for subsequent execution.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and further identifies suspicious command-line arguments often associated with post-exploitation activity like discovery, credential gathering, or file manipulation.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
Detects the FileFix execution chain, where victims are socially engineered into pasting a malicious path into the Windows Explorer address bar. This action results in explorer.exe launching suspicious command-line tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe) with suspicious flags or unusually long, potentially obfuscated arguments characteristic of a 'ClickFix' style attack.
Detects various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including known malicious file hashes, suspicious file names commonly associated with staging or initialization in web directories, and network communication to known malicious domains or URLs. It also monitors process execution command lines for references to these IOCs, excluding common browser processes.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity where a web server process spawns a command shell, executes system discovery commands, and immediately initiates an outbound network connection. This behavior is indicative of a web-based exploit leading to interactive command execution and subsequent C2 communication.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects the abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute processes via wmic.exe or WmiPrvSE.exe, often combined with obfuscated command-line arguments such as encoded PowerShell or CMD commands.
Detects potential 'ClickFix' activity where a browser or file explorer process initiates a shell (e.g., cmd, powershell, osascript) with command arguments indicative of remote script execution, obfuscated commands, or web-based payload downloading. This pattern matches known social engineering tactics that entice users to copy-paste malicious code into a system shell.
This rule detects potential ClickFix/InstallFix attacks where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command from a website that mimics a legitimate developer tool installation (e.g., Claude Code, NotebookLM). The detection flags the use of common download-and-execute cmdlets (e.g., irm, iwr, iex) within common Windows shell interpreters while excluding known legitimate vendor install domains.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
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