Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a PowerShell or command shell process spawned directly by explorer.exe, consistent with a victim using the Win+R Run dialog to paste and execute a clipboard-borne command as instructed by a fake 'Webcam Compatibility'/'SECURITY WARNING'/'Zoom SDK Update' ClickFix modal. Tightened to reduce false positives from routine admin Run-dialog usage by excluding shell invocations that reference a saved script file (-File, .ps1/.bat/.vbs) or common IT support script/deployment paths, since a genuine ClickFix paste-execute is an inline one-off command typed/pasted directly into the Run box rather than a call to a maintained script. Analysts should additionally corroborate with a short-lived explorer.exe parent session (Run dialog opened immediately before the child process spawn) where session telemetry is available.
Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process.
Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
Detects the use of common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) or PowerShell cmdlets typically utilized to download and execute remote payloads. The rule specifically monitors for BITSAdmin transfers, CertUtil URL cache retrievals, MSHTA remote execution, and PowerShell combined with WebClient/DownloadString and hidden windows.
Detects suspicious execution patterns associated with the SleeperGem supply chain attack, where a compromised Gem install script (git_credential_manager-2.8.3/bin/install) spawns shell or PowerShell commands to trigger secondary malicious scripts like deploy.sh or redirects output to /dev/null.
Detects an obfuscated, hidden-window PowerShell loader chaining campaign-specific SET environment-variable assignments to stage a payload path and download a next-stage payload from cdn.zoom-videos infrastructure, consistent with BlueNoroff's ClickFix PowerShell staging technique.
Detects the use of common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) or PowerShell cmdlets typically utilized to download and execute remote payloads. The rule specifically monitors for BITSAdmin transfers, CertUtil URL cache retrievals, MSHTA remote execution, and PowerShell combined with WebClient/DownloadString and hidden windows.
Detects suspicious delivery and execution chains characteristic of the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) group. The rule monitors for WScript, CScript, or CMD processes spawning PowerShell with evasive flags (hidden, bypass, encoded, etc.) accessing suspicious file paths, or the execution of a renamed AutoIt3 binary from non-standard locations like Temp or AppData, which are common indicators of stage-two downloader activity.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for specific PowerShell commands associated with file encryption (AES, CreateEncryptor, TransformFinalBlock) and suspicious file manipulation patterns, such as mass renaming of files with common ransomware extensions or the dropping of known ransom note filenames.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell execution sequence initiated by explorer.exe that exhibits multiple indicators of malicious behavior within a short timeframe. The detection logic correlates PowerShell process creation (using obfuscated arguments or common attack flags) with subsequent network connections (C2), file writes to temporary directories, and execution of child processes from those same directories. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware loaders, such as Vidar Stealer, staging payloads and executing them.
Detects ClickFix social engineering used in the TELEPUZ/VIDAR campaign where a user is tricked into executing a PowerShell command that downloads a binary from memshowblob.forum using bypass flags and removes the Zone.Identifier ADS. Part of the CLICKFIX-VIDAR initial access chain delivering TELEPUZ MaaS malware.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets 'Get-CimInstance' and 'Stop-Process' to identify and terminate chrome.exe processes. This behavior may be used by adversaries to stop browsers or security software components that could interfere with malicious activities.
Detects the use of mshta.exe to fetch and execute remote content that subsequently spawns PowerShell, often utilizing techniques to obfuscate commands or load scripts in-memory. This behavior is indicative of fileless malware execution or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe launched by powershell.exe where the command line includes a remote URL. This pattern mimics the 'ClickFix' execution chain where explorer.exe initiates PowerShell, which in turn invokes mshta.exe to fetch and execute a remote payload, a common technique for initial access and execution.
Detects instances of explorer.exe spawning command shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) with arguments. This behavior is indicative of a user launching commands directly via the Windows Run dialog or executing scripts from the shell, which can be a vector for malicious activity.
Detects lateral movement patterns involving PsExec or PSEXESVC where either a suspicious command-line flag (e.g., '-psex') is present or the PsExec service spawns child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe executing suspicious, obfuscated, or remotely retrieved payloads.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iwr' (Invoke-WebRequest) to download content from a direct IP address. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to stage malicious payloads or tools directly from external infrastructure, bypassing domain-based reputation filters.
Detects the use of mshta.exe to fetch and execute remote content that subsequently spawns PowerShell, often utilizing techniques to obfuscate commands or load scripts in-memory. This behavior is indicative of fileless malware execution or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects PowerShell command line activity involving the use of Net.WebClient for network downloads in conjunction with IO.Compression.ZipArchive for file extraction, specifically targeting paths associated with the LogiOptionsPlus software. This pattern suggests potential staging of malicious payloads, such as an embedded Python loader or binary disguised within a legitimate directory.
Detects the use of common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) or PowerShell cmdlets typically utilized to download and execute remote payloads. The rule specifically monitors for BITSAdmin transfers, CertUtil URL cache retrievals, MSHTA remote execution, and PowerShell combined with WebClient/DownloadString and hidden windows.
This rule detects the use of XOR encoding patterns in PowerShell command-line arguments. Adversaries frequently use XOR encoding or other obfuscation techniques within scripts to hide malicious commands or payloads from static analysis and security tools.
Detects ClickFix social engineering used in the TELEPUZ/VIDAR campaign where a user is tricked into executing a PowerShell command that downloads a binary from memshowblob.forum using bypass flags and removes the Zone.Identifier ADS. Part of the CLICKFIX-VIDAR initial access chain delivering TELEPUZ MaaS malware.
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