Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ClickFix social engineering used in the TELEPUZ/VIDAR campaign where a user is tricked into executing a PowerShell command that downloads a binary from memshowblob.forum using bypass flags and removes the Zone.Identifier ADS. Part of the CLICKFIX-VIDAR initial access chain delivering TELEPUZ MaaS malware.
Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts using the PowerShell 'Start-Process' cmdlet with the 'runAs' verb, which requests administrative privileges for a new process. The rule also includes a specific check for command-line artifacts associated with the 'wipe32' malware campaign, which utilizes this method for privilege escalation.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that combine randomized long variable names with synthetically generated no-op or dead loop structures, a common technique to evade signature-based detection and increase analysis time.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe launched by powershell.exe where the command line includes a remote URL. This pattern mimics the 'ClickFix' execution chain where explorer.exe initiates PowerShell, which in turn invokes mshta.exe to fetch and execute a remote payload, a common technique for initial access and execution.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that combine randomized long variable names with synthetically generated no-op or dead loop structures, a common technique to evade signature-based detection and increase analysis time.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets 'Get-CimInstance' and 'Stop-Process' to identify and terminate chrome.exe processes. This behavior may be used by adversaries to stop browsers or security software components that could interfere with malicious activities.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe launched by powershell.exe where the command line includes a remote URL. This pattern mimics the 'ClickFix' execution chain where explorer.exe initiates PowerShell, which in turn invokes mshta.exe to fetch and execute a remote payload, a common technique for initial access and execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via mshta.exe or wscript.exe, specifically when the command line includes encoded commands. This is a common pattern for attackers using living-off-the-land binaries to execute obfuscated malicious payloads, bypassing basic security controls.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using PowerShell commands that incorporate execution policy bypass and hidden window styling. This pattern is commonly observed in malware loaders and persistence mechanisms to minimize visual indicators during execution.
This KQL detects potential Microsoft Defender tampering via PowerShell, including attempts to disable real-time or behavior monitoring and add Defender exclusions. It enriches results with tamper type, suspicious PowerShell flags, and confidence level to help prioritize medium/high-confidence activity.
Detects the installation of Python on Windows systems using various package managers (WinGet, Chocolatey, Scoop), MSI installers, or direct download methods via command-line utilities like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with bypass execution policy flags originating from the nvidia-sysruntime.exe process. This behavior is associated with the LabubaRAT malware, which leverages this specific parent process to execute malicious PowerShell commands while evading policy restrictions.
This KQL detects activity associated with network traffic to known C2 infrastructure (45.146.252.17), suspicious Node/NPM execution chains and dropped payload/marker files. Also looks for indicators of remote control, clipboard access, screenshot/desktop-control packages, Socket.IO C2 traffic, and file/browser/wallet data exfiltration behavior.
Detects suspicious delivery and execution chains characteristic of the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) group. The rule monitors for WScript, CScript, or CMD processes spawning PowerShell with evasive flags (hidden, bypass, encoded, etc.) accessing suspicious file paths, or the execution of a renamed AutoIt3 binary from non-standard locations like Temp or AppData, which are common indicators of stage-two downloader activity.
Detects a hidden, non-interactive PowerShell process that programmatically enumerates mounted disk images (VHDX/ISO) using Get-DiskImage or Get-Partition, dismounts them, and potentially deletes the backing files. This behavior is indicative of post-execution cleanup routines used by malware delivered via mounted container images, such as the Overlord RAT.
Detects the use of PowerShell or administrative command-line tools (net, sc) to enumerate and forcefully stop critical backup, database, and virtualization services. This behavior is commonly observed in ransomware attacks where adversaries disable security-critical or data-hosting services prior to encryption to ensure file locks are released and backups are incapacitated.
Detects ClickFix social engineering used in the TELEPUZ/VIDAR campaign where a user is tricked into executing a PowerShell command that downloads a binary from memshowblob.forum using bypass flags and removes the Zone.Identifier ADS. Part of the CLICKFIX-VIDAR initial access chain delivering TELEPUZ MaaS malware.
This rule detects the use of XOR encoding patterns in PowerShell command-line arguments. Adversaries frequently use XOR encoding or other obfuscation techniques within scripts to hide malicious commands or payloads from static analysis and security tools.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts associated with unauthorized Active Directory information gathering. This includes the execution of specific scripts from ProgramData and the logging of known reconnaissance commands or script contents within PowerShell event logs.
This rule detects PowerShell commands initiated by web browsers that exhibit characteristics of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique. The detection logic looks for high-risk flags (hidden window, bypass execution policy) associated with common ClickFix artifacts such as references to temporary directories, domain-specific indicators like 'memshowblob.forum', and the removal of Zone.Identifier alternate data streams which are often used to bypass security warnings.
Detects PowerShell script block execution containing patterns associated with network discovery, specifically splitting IP strings and calculating /24 subnets, often indicative of host or network reconnaissance.
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