Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands and scripts known to be used for Kerberoasting, a technique for obtaining TGS tickets that can be cracked offline to recover service account passwords. The rule matches specific tool names and command line flags associated with common offensive security tools.
Detects instances where ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe spawns known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) or executes binaries from suspicious paths. This behavior is indicative of abuse of the WinGet DSC WindowsProcess resource block to execute arbitrary commands.
Detects Lunar Client spawning suspicious child processes or command lines, which is characteristic of exploit chains like 'lunar-modrinth-chain-poc'. These attacks typically leverage renderer vulnerabilities to execute shell commands, .lnk files, or arbitrary binaries via abused APIs like shell.openExternal or malicious modpack overrides.
Detects unauthorized or malicious shell command execution spawned by the Amazon Q Developer VS Code extension, originating from a workspace-defined MCP (Model Context Protocol) server configuration file (.amazonq/mcp.json or .vscode/mcp.json) as associated with the CVE-2026-12957 vulnerability.
This rule detects attempts to disable Microsoft Defender security features or create exclusions via Windows Registry modifications or PowerShell cmdlets. It identifies tampering with Registry keys related to disabling AntiSpyware, behavior monitoring, or real-time protection, as well as the execution of PowerShell commands that adjust Defender preferences, such as disabling real-time monitoring or adding wide-scope file exclusions.
This rule detects Go-compiled backdoor binaries executing from suspicious, non-standard directories (e.g., ProgramData, AppData, Temp, Public) and initiating cmd.exe or powershell.exe for command execution. This behavior is consistent with the deployment and operational tactics of The Gentlemen RaaS group's custom Go-based malware.
Detects suspicious WinRM SOAPAction headers indicating potential lateral movement or remote command execution (e.g., shell command, process creation, or WMI operations) over WinRM HTTP ports 5985 and 5986.
This rule detects PowerShell command lines that contain indicators associated with AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass techniques and low-level memory manipulation methods, such as 'VirtualProtect' and 'GetFunctionPointer' used in conjunction with 'RuntimeHelpers'. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to subvert defensive security mechanisms and execute malicious code in memory.
Detects a suspicious process execution chain where explorer.exe or userinit.exe spawns cmd.exe, which in turn launches PowerShell to execute a hidden, bypassed, and obfuscated script involving content retrieval from the C:\ProgramData directory. This pattern is characteristic of the UAC-0226 GIFTEDCROOK actor's persistence mechanism using LNK files.
This rule detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by executing PowerShell commands that manipulate memory structures directly. Specifically, it looks for the use of the Marshal.WriteInt64 method to nullify the pAppName pointer at offset 0x08 within the AMSI_CONTEXT_INTERNAL structure, a known technique to disable AMSI scanning for the current process.
Detects the use of .NET reflection within PowerShell to access the 'AmsiUtils' class and set the 'amsiInitFailed' field to true. This technique effectively disables the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) for the current PowerShell process, allowing subsequent malicious code or scripts to execute without being scanned for threats.
Detects the execution of Nishang's Invoke-PowerShellTcp reverse shell script via PowerShell, typically executed via IEX (Invoke-Expression) to load the payload directly into memory, which is a common post-exploitation technique often performed following an AMSI bypass.
Detects exploitation activity associated with CVE-2025-8088 used by UAC-0226 (GIFTEDCROOK). The rule monitors for WinRAR-family archive tools dropping files into the startup folder, staging payloads into C:\ProgramData, and the subsequent logon execution chain where cmd.exe launches PowerShell to execute encoded commands or content from ProgramData.
Detects the execution of scripting interpreters and remote management tools originating from the SimpleHelp RMM process tree. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation abuse where an attacker, having hijacked a technician session (e.g., via CVE-2026-48558 OIDC bypass), uses the RMM console to execute commands on remote endpoints.
Detects anomalous activity where multiple distinct Living-off-the-Land (LotL) binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, systeminfo.exe) are executed on the same device within a single hour. This threshold of 4 unique administrative or discovery tools being used in a short timeframe is often indicative of reconnaissance, lateral movement, or post-exploitation environment assessment by an adversary.
Detects the use of living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as PowerShell, curl, certutil, bitsadmin, or mshta to download potential secondary payloads from self-hosted GitLab instances. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey loader chain, where compromised GitLab infrastructure is used as a repository to stage and distribute StealC or other malicious payloads.
Detects instances of common web browser processes (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, etc.) spawning command-line interpreters or scripting hosts (PowerShell, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This pattern is consistent with ClickFix social engineering attacks, where users are manipulated into copying and executing malicious commands from a fake CAPTCHA or error prompt.
Detects the hallmark of a ClickFix attack: a user tricked by a fake error message into pasting a PowerShell command into the Run dialog (explorer.exe), which accesses the clipboard.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform automated reconnaissance against Microsoft Graph API endpoints, specifically targeting HR, payroll, and personal user data. This activity is associated with post-compromise behaviors seen in campaigns like Payroll Pirate, where attackers utilize compromised credentials to harvest sensitive organizational information.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules via PowerShell, specifically targeting cmdlets commonly used by attackers to hide phishing indicator emails, security alerts, or C2 communications by moving or deleting them into folders like Junk, Deleted Items, or Archive. The rule monitors for both direct usage on the endpoint and remote administration patterns via Exchange Online/EWS remoting.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (encoded commands, hidden window style, or specific payload strings like 'MiniJunk') originating from common file staging directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp, AppData). This pattern is often indicative of malicious post-lure payload execution.
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