Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage Windows Forms or GDI APIs (e.g., System.Windows.Forms.Screen, System.Drawing.Bitmap, CopyFromScreen) to perform screen capture. Adversaries often use these native .NET capabilities to capture desktop screenshots during post-exploitation.
Detects the use of WMI (via WmiPrvSE.exe or wmic.exe) to enumerate or terminate PowerShell processes. This behavior is indicative of the Amadey/StealC delivery chain, where a JScript dropper uses WMI to clean up script execution artifacts after a specified timeout, aiding in defense evasion.
Detects instances of PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh) launched with encoded command line arguments (-encodedcommand, -enc, -ec). This is a common technique used by attackers to obfuscate malicious scripts and payloads by passing them as Base64 encoded strings to avoid simple static analysis.
This rule detects potential web shell activity on ColdFusion or IIS servers by monitoring for the creation of known malicious file names typically associated with web shells and the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, whoami.exe, powershell.exe) by common web server worker processes (w3wp.exe, coldfusion.exe, jrun.exe). It also identifies suspicious command-line patterns referencing the web root directory.
Detects reconnaissance activity where an adversary uses common administrative utilities (e.g., wmic, powershell, tasklist, sc, reg) to identify installed security software, antivirus products, or monitoring agents on a Windows system. This activity is often a precursor to defense evasion or impairment.
Detects the execution of command-line interfaces (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe) when spawned by common browser processes or Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for drive-by downloads or malicious scripts executed via the browser, characterized by command lines containing download indicators (e.g., Invoke-Expression, curl, certutil, encoded commands).
This rule monitors email gateway and EDR telemetry for indicators associated with the CastleLoader malware and the EvilTokens phishing campaign. It flags specific keywords in email subjects, filenames, sender domains, and URLs, as well as suspicious binary execution patterns and child processes spawning from common office applications or web browsers.
Detects the execution of command-line tools associated with virtual machine management (ESXi CLI, PowerCLI, Hyper-V). The rule monitors for specific process executions (esxcli, vim-cmd, powershell) that involve administrative VM actions such as creating or starting virtual machines, which may indicate malicious VM orchestration, data destruction, or persistence attempts in virtualized environments.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote) launching command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This pattern is often associated with macro-based malicious code execution.
Detects malicious PowerShell activity associated with the Gamaredon group, specifically targeting obfuscated command lines used for HTML smuggling and downloader execution. This rule monitors for combined Base64 and HTML entity decoding, .NET reflection-based assembly loading, suspicious mshta.exe spawning PowerShell, and PowerShell creating HTML files.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious executable or script files (.exe, .lnk, .vbs, .ps1, .hta) or autorun.inf files on removable drives (D-Z) initiated by common script interpreters or suspicious processes. This activity is then correlated with prior detections of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM/Primitive Bear) implant activity, such as Ptero-family malware, specific obfuscated PowerShell patterns, or HTML smuggling delivery via mail/Office clients on the same host within a 24-hour window.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe) initiated by mmc.exe or explorer.exe, excluding known legitimate Microsoft Management Console (MMC) flags and common management snap-ins. This pattern is indicative of potential proxy execution or misuse of system administration utilities to run unauthorized code.
Detects svchost.exe or 'Mixed Reality.exe' spawning common system and security enumeration tools (such as wmic.exe, systeminfo.exe, or tasklist.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of the DcRAT 'SendInfo()' routine. This pattern is characteristic of malware performing reconnaissance of installed security software and system identification.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes spawned by script hosts (wscript.exe, mshta.exe) with common bypass/encoded flags. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns involving known malicious infrastructure domains or specific suspected payload filenames, indicative of the Millenium RAT dropper activity.
Detects instances where a browser or email client spawns a PowerShell process containing common obfuscated command-line arguments (e.g., -enc, IEX, bypass), which then subsequently executes node.exe or wscript.exe. This pattern is characteristic of the TONResolver infection chain, where a phishing lure triggers initial code execution via browser or email client to deploy a JavaScript-based RAT.
This rule detects potential attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for the loading of amsi.dll in suspicious processes, combined with behavioral indicators such as execution from user-writable paths, child process creation, or outbound network connections, and the presence of strings associated with common AMSI bypass techniques.
Detects ClickFix social engineering lures where a web browser spawns script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as base64-encoded payloads, remote download cradles, or execution with hidden window flags.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of Gamaredon (Shuckworm) threat group activity. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes utilizing command-line arguments typical of their 2025 downloader toolset (such as PteroPaste, PteroDee, and PteroCache), specifically combining encoded commands, in-memory execution (IEX/Invoke-Expression), and remote file fetching (DownloadString).
Search Common EventCodes (EventID’s) for Suspicious Behavior
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments containing keywords indicative of in-memory download and execution, such as '-enc' or '-EncodedCommand' used in conjunction with 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) or 'DownloadString'. This pattern is a common TTP for initial access and second-stage payload delivery, and was observed in the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell).
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with the BeepRAT malware loader chain. It monitors for the execution of TCC.exe (a common name for Tiny C Compiler used by some malwares for dynamic compilation) with specific command-line arguments like -nostdlib and -run, as well as the spawning of suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe) by TCC.exe or the presence of a temp.bin file in the command line, which is indicative of BeepRAT shellcode loading behavior.
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