Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) scripts that contain patterns indicating evasion techniques. Specifically, this rule identifies the combined use of execution delays (e.g., Start-Sleep, WScript.Sleep, ping/timeout) and environment/sandbox fingerprinting (e.g., WMI queries for ComputerSystem, hypervisor detection, or CPUID) often used by malware to detect virtual environments before executing malicious payloads (typically via IEX or Invoke-Expression).
Detects instances where the Exchange Server IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns unexpected child processes like PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd, often indicating exploitation of vulnerabilities such as ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082) where an attacker leverages Exchange backend processes for arbitrary command execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) involving commands that access the clipboard, which is a common indicator of the ClickFix social engineering attack technique. In this scenario, users are deceived into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Run dialog.
Detects the hallmark of a ClickFix attack: a user tricked by a fake error message into pasting a PowerShell command into the Run dialog (explorer.exe), which accesses the clipboard. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell commands initiated by explorer.exe that contain 'Get-Clipboard', 'iwr' (Invoke-WebRequest), or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression).
Detects Windows Terminal (wt.exe) spawning PowerShell with specific command-line arguments, typically indicative of user-pasted malicious commands from ClickFix fake update lures linked to Rapid Brigantine.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities, script interpreters, or installers spawned by web browsers from high-risk directories such as the User Downloads, Temp, or TMP folders. This behavior is indicative of a user downloading and executing malicious files or scripts directly from a web browser.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell or Command Prompt to execute commands related to Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software or remote management tools such as IDrive or TeamViewer. It specifically looks for command-line arguments involving RMM-related keywords combined with execution flags or piping operators, which is a common pattern for automating the deployment, configuration, or malicious use of these remote access tools.
Identifies execution of the Windows PowerShell cradle used by GLASSWORM's WASM loader. It looks for 'irm' fetching a URL containing the specific '/win32/i/_' path structure, piped to 'iex'.
Detects the deletion of specific files associated with Mistic sideloading artifacts ('EndpointDlp.dll' or 'MpExtMs.exe') using command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to remove forensic traces or secondary payloads after initial compromise.
This rule detects indicators of WMI event subscription persistence, including the creation of WMI event filters, consumers, and bindings. It monitors for the use of command-line tools like wmic, powershell, or mofcomp to manipulate WMI objects, and identifies suspicious process activity originating from WMI provider host or consumer processes.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh.exe) are spawned as child processes of common COM object host processes (e.g., wscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe). The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments containing encoded commands or indicators of download cradles (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, DownloadString), which are common patterns for fileless execution and malicious script staging.
This rule detects the execution of common network share enumeration tools or scripts, specifically looking for the execution of netscan.exe (or similar) or PowerShell commands utilizing common share finding utilities like Invoke-ShareFinder, CheckShareAccess, or commands exporting share information to files.
Detects a suspected malicious activity sequence where PowerShell is used to download the cloudflared utility from GitHub, followed by a silent MSI installation of cloudflared. This sequence is indicative of post-exploitation activity often associated with Bumblebee malware leading to the establishment of covert C2 tunneling, frequently observed in Akira ransomware intrusion chains.
Detects instances where the 'splunkd' process acts as a parent to common command-line interpreters (e.g., bash, powershell, python) or network utilities (e.g., curl, wget, netcat, nmap). This behavior is highly suspicious as the Splunk daemon should not typically invoke shells or network tools, and may indicate exploitation of the Splunk environment, lateral movement, or unauthorized task execution.
This rule detects a remote interactive logon (Logon Type 10) via RDP, followed by a PowerShell process executing 'net.exe' with sensitive administrative arguments such as 'administrator', '/active:yes', or '/dom'. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to elevate privileges or modify domain/local account properties after establishing initial access via Remote Desktop.
A detection triggered on endpoint events where common system binaries (e.g., mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) were launched by user-facing parent processes (explorer.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe) and executed suspicious command-lines. The pattern matches the evolving technique used in ClickFix-style campaigns whereby malicious pages dynamically place payloads into the clipboard and prompt users to paste or execute them.
Detects PowerShell processes executing with command-line arguments that suggest the use of 'Get-Alias' (gal) or 'Get-Command' (gcm) followed by suspicious patterns. This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover system capabilities or installed modules.
Detects the unauthorized use of 'wbadmin.exe' to initiate a backup of Active Directory components (like 'ntds.dit' or the SYSTEM registry hive) when executed from common command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). The rule correlates this backup activity with subsequent direct file access to sensitive AD database or registry files by processes other than standard system services (e.g., ntds.exe, lsass.exe), often indicative of credential dumping or exfiltration.
Detects the installation of 'cloudflared.exe' as a Windows service from a non-standard file path. The rule specifically correlates this service installation with preceding PowerShell commands typically used to download remote files, consistent with tradecraft observed in Akira and Bumblebee campaigns to establish covert C2 tunneling.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of LSASS memory dumping followed by lateral movement via SMB administrative shares. The rule monitors for suspicious OpenProcess calls targeting lsass.exe, the subsequent creation of dump files in temporary directories, and concurrent access to admin shares (ADMIN$ or C$) from the same host, which is a common pattern for credential harvesting and lateral movement tools like 'lsassy'.
This rule detects the deployment and execution of the RustDesk remote access tool in conjunction with potential staging of installation artifacts and observed prior activity related to BumbleBee/Adaptix C2. It correlates process execution, file creation, and network connectivity to the RustDesk relay infrastructure to assign a risk score, helping identify potential unauthorized remote access or malicious persistence.
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