Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with an encoded command flag when spawned directly from explorer.exe or cmd.exe. This pattern is frequently used in 'ClickFix' style attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious, obfuscated PowerShell code into the Windows run dialog or command prompt.
Detects potential BaoLoader drive-by compromise attempts by monitoring two stages: first, the creation of executable files in temporary or application data directories by browser processes; and second, the execution of command-line shells by processes running from those same directories where the browser acted as the grandparent.
Detects instances where common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) spawn command-line tools or script interpreters (cmd, PowerShell, wscript, mshta) as child processes. This behavior is highly indicative of drive-by download attacks, including the 'ClickFix' technique, where users are socially engineered into executing malicious commands under the guise of fake browser updates or error resolution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with an encoded command flag when spawned directly from explorer.exe or cmd.exe. This pattern is frequently used in 'ClickFix' style attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious, obfuscated PowerShell code into the Windows run dialog or command prompt.
This rule detects a multi-stage loader chain behavior. Stage 1 identifies PowerShell spawning mshta.exe or wscript.exe, which is commonly used to execute malicious scripts or loaders. Stage 2 detects mshta.exe or wscript.exe subsequently executing schtasks.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments indicative of establishing persistence via scheduled tasks or WMI event subscriptions.
Detects attempts by LCRYX ransomware to disable security protections, including Windows Defender real-time monitoring and firewall, as well as third-party antivirus software (Bitdefender, Kaspersky). The detection monitors process creation events for malicious command-line arguments, excluding legitimate administrative processes like msiexec.exe or services.exe.
This rule detects lateral movement activity associated with the Impacket toolkit. It monitors for the execution of common Impacket scripts (e.g., psexec.py, smbexec.py, wmiexec.py) or binaries (psexec.exe/PsExec64.exe) spawning from suspicious parent processes or interacting with sensitive Windows shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). Additionally, it flags Python processes performing SMB connections to multiple internal hosts, as well as cmd.exe/powershell.exe instances spawned from services.exe that reference Impacket tool names in their command lines.
This rule detects the DRAYN malware performing environment reconnaissance and sandbox evasion. It monitors for file access to the 'vmbusr.sys' driver, which is commonly used to identify virtual machine environments, followed by the execution of PowerShell commands to retrieve the system's UUID via Win32_ComputerSystem, a technique used for host fingerprinting.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities associated with LCRYX ransomware, starting with PowerShell execution containing AMSI bypass strings (e.g., AmsiInitFailed, amsiContext), followed by event log clearing using wevtutil or PowerShell Clear-EventLog, or disabling of audit policies using auditpol.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious download-related commands (Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadFile, WebClient, IEX, DownloadString) when initiated through conhost.exe, specifically when the originating parent process is a common shell or utility associated with shortcut (.lnk) file execution or specific command patterns.
Detects PowerShell executing a reflective .NET assembly load, indicated by keywords like 'Reflection.Assembly', 'Load', and 'byte' in the command line. The detection is further refined by looking for 'Extension.SubRoutine', 'Run2', or the C2 domain 'hellolargeworld.com' in the command line, and specifically targets instances where the initiating process is 'node.exe'. This behavior is indicative of the 'protocal.cjs' backdoor.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell script behavior that attempts to patch the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) in-memory by manipulating internal .NET/CLR methods. It identifies the combination of dangerous API calls (e.g., VirtualProtect, Marshal.Copy, PrepareMethod) typically used to bypass AMSI scanning via JIT compilation patching targeting the WinScanContent method.
This rule detects potential attempts to disable Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell 5.1 using reflection-based manipulation of the amsiInitFailed boolean field in the System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class. Attackers often use obfuscation techniques such as splitting strings or using reflection methods to bypass static security signatures.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by dynamically creating methods using System.Reflection.Emit. It looks for specific keywords associated with reflection-based AMSI tampering, such as creating dynamic methods, accessing internal IL generators, and explicitly targeting AMSI-related memory structures like amsiContext or s_amsiInitFailed.
This rule detects potential malicious activity involving PowerShell by correlating signs of an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempt with an subsequent network connection to an external, non-standard port. The rule monitors for common command-line patterns used to disable or impair AMSI functionality within PowerShell processes, followed by suspicious outbound network traffic from the same process within a five-minute window.
This rule detects instances where the w3wp.exe (IIS worker process) spawns command-line interpreters like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and these interpreters execute common discovery commands such as 'whoami', 'hostname', or 'ipconfig'. This behavior can indicate a web server compromise where an attacker is attempting to gain information about the compromised system or network.
Detects common web server processes (IIS, Apache, Nginx, PHP, Tomcat) spawning command-line interpreters or utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, certutil.exe). This pattern is often indicative of exploitation of a web application to gain command execution on the host.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript, mshta, certutil) directly spawned by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This is a common indicator of macro-based attacks or other exploit delivery chains where Office documents are used to execute malicious payloads.
This detection identifies a pattern associated with the "ClickFix" social engineering technique, where a user is tricked into copying a malicious command and pasting it into a PowerShell terminal. The query correlates a recent clipboard operation with a subsequent suspicious PowerShell execution by the same user on the same device.
Detects PowerShell executing a reflective .NET assembly load, potentially indicative of a backdoor, initiated by a Node.js process. The detection specifically looks for keywords related to .NET Reflection, assembly loading, byte arrays, and a suspicious C2 domain (hellolargeworld.com) or invocation method (Extension.SubRoutine.Run2).
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands used to initiate remote sessions (e.g., New-PSSession, Invoke-Command) targeting specific remote hosts, excluding localhost connections and common system processes. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement or remote administration activities.
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