Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of common PowerShell cmdlets often associated with fileless malware execution, such as 'Invoke-Expression', 'IEX', or 'DownloadString', initiated by 'powershell.exe'. These patterns are frequently used to download and execute malicious payloads directly in memory, bypassing traditional disk-based scanning.
This rule detects the execution of potentially malicious processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe) initiated by mmc.exe or explorer.exe, excluding known legitimate Microsoft Management Console (MMC) flags and common management snap-ins. This pattern is indicative of potential proxy execution or misuse of system administration utilities to run unauthorized code.
Detects the unique PowerShell de-obfuscation sequence used by ErrTraffic ClickFix lures to drop follow-on payloads. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell command or script block execution events containing the string patterns "-bxor[int][char]$" and "[convert]::ToInt32", which are indicative of the custom XOR decryption and type conversion methods employed by this malware distribution framework.
Detects the initial ClickFix mechanism where a user is socially engineered into pasting a malicious script (Get-Clipboard) into the Run dialog (explorer.exe), which launches PowerShell to fetch the CastleLoader.
Detects suspicious reconnaissance activity involving multiple common Windows discovery tools (nltest, net, dsquery, ipconfig, whoami, systeminfo) executed within a short time window (5 minutes) that was preceded (within 30 minutes) by a command shell (powershell.exe or cmd.exe) spawned by a web browser or common script-based execution engine (e.g., mshta.exe). This pattern is indicative of a post-exploitation phase where an attacker, having gained execution via a browser-based delivery method, performs environment discovery.
Detects activity associated with the Lightlife RAT, which involves PowerShell scripts accessing cryptocurrency wallet browser extension directories, staging data using archive utilities, and exfiltrating collected data to external destinations like the Telegram Bot API.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, pwsh) spawned by Windows Explorer (explorer.exe). The rule flags processes with long command lines or those containing evidence of obfuscation (Base64 encoding) or common command-line indicators used for weaponized scripts, such as download requests or expression invocation.
This rule detects the creation of .lnk files in common suspicious directories (such as startup folders, Temp, or Downloads) followed by the execution of common scripting or command interpreters (powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe) with long command lines within a 10-minute window. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to achieve persistence or execute malicious payloads via user interaction.
Detects instances where PowerShell is spawned directly from Microsoft Teams processes or via explorer.exe shortly after receiving an external chat message in Teams. This pattern is often associated with social engineering lures, such as the 'paste-and-run' attack chain used to facilitate malicious activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that bypass execution policies to specifically disable or suspend BitLocker protection. This behavior is often associated with ransomware or malicious actors attempting to circumvent full-disk encryption to facilitate data manipulation or destruction.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity linked to files or processes within the Windows temporary directory. It identifies three distinct malicious patterns: (1) sensitive privilege usage (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege) by processes running from temp; (2) presence of known malicious file names associated with a specific campaign (vile_*.ico, vile_*.lnk, etc.); and (3) PowerShell execution of a specific decryptor shortcut file from the temp directory.
Detects instances of node.exe spawning wmic.exe or powershell.exe to perform security software discovery. The malware uses WMI queries or registry enumeration to identify common security agents (e.g., CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender) likely to determine if it is running in a monitored environment.
Detects execution chains where Outlook launches a VBScript file that subsequently invokes PowerShell with encoded commands, characteristic of Gamaredon (ACTINIUM) threat activity. Additionally, it identifies the creation of VBScript/VBE files in temporary directories, which is consistent with the deployment of PteroVDoor or PteroPSDoor loaders.
Detects instances where the WinRAR process (winrar.exe) spawns common script interpreters or command-line shells, including mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code embedded in or extracted from a compressed archive.
This rule detects PowerShell activity where commands are used to perform reconnaissance (e.g., whoami, ipconfig, or network group enumeration) and the output is exfiltrated or sent via a POST request to a specific external IP address (202.182.102.5).
Detects execution patterns associated with the Gamaredon group's spearphishing chains, specifically where PowerShell is invoked by common document or scripting applications (Winword, Excel, mshta, etc.) containing typical downloader flags (IEX, EncodedCommand). Additionally, it monitors for network connections from PowerShell to known dead-drop resolvers (e.g., telegra.ph, cloudflare workers) used by PteroOdd/Kazuar loaders.
Detects instances where mshta.exe is used to launch suspicious child processes such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe, or is associated with HTA files or PteroSand-related indicators. This behavior is indicative of HTML smuggling or malicious HTA-based delivery of secondary payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Bash commands, potentially for implant delivery, spawned from Visual Studio Code extension host processes (node.exe, code.exe, code-server, cursor). This rule specifically looks for command-line patterns associated with the GLASSWORM.WASM threat, such as 'irm', 'iex', 'curl -fsSL', 'Invoke-Expression', 'IEX', or combinations of 'powershell -Command', 'curl -fsSL', and 'bash -c'.
Detects instances where the Node.js executable (node.exe) spawns common command shells or scripting interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is often indicative of Node.js-based applications being used as a staging point for command execution, a common pattern in post-exploitation or the usage of malicious npm packages.
Detects instances where the Node.js executable (node.exe) spawns common command shells or scripting interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is often indicative of Node.js-based applications being used as a staging point for command execution, a common pattern in post-exploitation or the usage of malicious npm packages.
Detects multiple host enumeration techniques indicative of pre-encryption discovery activity. The rule monitors for the sequential or combined use of tasklist.exe, PowerShell Get-Process, cmd dir /s, and findstr.exe on a single host within a 30-minute window, which is a common behavior pattern for various ransomware strains.
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