Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects execution of PowerShell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) containing command-line arguments indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempts. This includes known bypass strings, reflection-based patching of memory internals (AmsiUtils, GetDelegateForFunctionPointer), and base64-encoded fragments of common bypass techniques.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Firewall settings using netsh, PowerShell, or direct registry modifications. Adversaries often perform these actions to evade detection and maintain uninhibited network communication for C2 or data exfiltration.
Detects programmatic file downloads from SharePoint and OneDrive using automation tools like PowerShell, PnP, Graph SDK, Python, Node.js, or generic CLI tools (curl, wget) rather than typical browser access. This can indicate data exfiltration.
Detects npm or node processes spawning shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) during package installation, which subsequently execute download utilities (curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin). This behavior is characteristic of malicious npm packages attempting to stage payloads during the 'preinstall' or 'postinstall' hooks.
This rule detects potentially suspicious activity related to VS Code extensions or development environments, specifically targeting the creation of 'tasks.json' files by Node.js processes, or the spawning of suspicious child processes (such as shells or interpreters) by VS Code-related processes with command lines associated with common malicious patterns or unauthorized automation.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity leveraging the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol over HTTP (ports 5985/5986). It specifically monitors for POST requests to the '/wsman' URI that contain the string 'powershell' in the request body, which is indicative of remote command execution via WinRM using PowerShell.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell or pwsh.exe with an encoded command. Adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate their malicious scripts and evade detection. The rule specifically looks for the '-EncodedCommand' or '-enc' parameter followed by a base64-encoded string of at least 20 characters.
Detects instances where 'node.exe' executes 'protocal.cjs' from 'NodePackages' paths, subsequently spawning child processes that perform host reconnaissance activities. This includes PowerShell commands querying registry keys related to installed software or listing applications.
Detects a PowerShell process initiated by node.exe that attempts to reflectively load a .NET assembly from memory. The detection specifically looks for keywords related to .NET Reflection, byte array loading, and a known C2 domain (hellolargeworld.com), along with the 'Extension.SubRoutine.Run2' invocation, indicating potential backdoor activity.
This rule detects attempts to disable PowerShell command history logging by using 'Set-PSReadlineOption' with 'HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing'. Adversaries often disable command history to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis.
This rule detects instances where AutoGen Studio or related AI agents initiate potentially suspicious child processes such as command interpreters (cmd, powershell, bash) or known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) while simultaneously establishing outbound WebSocket connections to Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoints. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to leverage AI agent automation capabilities for code execution or remote system interaction.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Access, Publisher) spawning common command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used as an initial access vector to execute arbitrary code.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell processes. The rule looks for known bypass strings, memory patching via Marshal, reflection-based disabling of AmsiUtils, or base64-encoded AMSI patch targets.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) initiates execution of suspicious binaries such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or other scripting tools. This behavior is a common indicator of web shell exploitation on internet-facing servers like Microsoft Exchange or SharePoint.
This rule detects two primary indicators of potentially malicious activity involving the Windows Explorer process: 1) Suspicious process parentage, where explorer.exe is spawned by a parent other than the standard winlogon.exe, userinit.exe, or explorer.exe, or where explorer.exe spawns unusual child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or others. 2) Possible Parent PID (PPID) spoofing, identified by the presence of specific API-related keywords in the command line (e.g., SeImpersonatePrivilege, CreateProcessWithToken) within process creation events.
This rule detects PowerShell or pwsh processes executing commands that contain the string 'autogenstudio' combined with a base64-encoded or obfuscated command pattern. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute obfuscated scripts or payloads associated with the Autogenstudio application or using it as a camouflage.
Detects an unknown/network-active parent process spawning shells used by ArachneC2 interactive shell or exec functionality.
Detects evidence of RustDesk session permission bypass exploitation. The rule monitors for the presence of known Proof-of-Concept (PoC) file artifacts, suspicious child processes spawned by RustDesk, use of elevated tokens by RustDesk-initiated processes, compilation of PoC tools using cargo, and outbound network connections from RustDesk to known relay ports.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that use the ExecutionPolicy Bypass flag while concurrently attempting to suspend BitLocker protection. This behavior is highly characteristic of ransomware activity, specifically associated with the ShrinkLocker malware, where the adversary disables disk encryption protection to facilitate malicious operations or subsequent encryption.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform DNS lookups for TXT records followed by immediate command execution, such as using 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Start-Process'. This pattern is frequently indicative of fileless command-and-control (C2) communication where stage-payload commands or scripts are retrieved via DNS TXT records to evade detection.
Detects instances where common video conferencing and collaboration applications (such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Webex, or Slack) initiate a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe). This behavior is often indicative of social engineering or phishing attacks where an adversary executes malicious code via a meeting invite or chat message.
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