Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious command line interpreters or downloaders stored in the Windows RunMRU registry key. This technique is often used in ClickFix attacks where users are socially engineered into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the variable splitting technique in cmd.exe specifically designed to obfuscate the invocation of PowerShell (e.g., set x=pow&&set y=ershell). This technique is used in the InstallFix campaign to bypass static command-line monitoring.
Detects an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning cmd.exe with a specific chain of reconnaissance commands (whoami, hostname, ipconfig). This behavior matches the default execution pattern of the 'hc2.aspx' and 'health_check_t.aspx' webshells observed in an Iranian-Nexus operation against Oman's government.
Suspicious IIS Worker Child Process
Cortex XDR
Detects the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning anomalous or administrative child processes (e.g., rundll32.exe, csvde.exe, nltest.exe), indicative of post-exploitation web shell activity associated with SHADOW-EARTH-053.
Detects when AI-integrated IDEs or coding agents spawn sensitive child processes such as command shells (cmd, powershell, pwsh) or web transfer tools (curl, wget). This behavior could indicate malicious activity if an attacker compromises the AI tool or if the tool itself is misused to execute arbitrary commands or exfiltrate data.
Detects the java.exe (ActiveMQ) process spawning cmd.exe to run certutil for payload delivery. This is highly indicative of CVE-2023-46604 post-exploitation activity, leading to Metasploit and LockBit ransomware deployment.
This rule detects when a Microsoft Office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) spawns a command interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This behavior is often indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled malware attempting to execute commands on the system.
Detects the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) worker process (w3wp.exe) or service (wsusservice.exe) spawning command-line tools like cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behavior is highly anomalous and strongly indicates a successful compromise, such as post-exploitation activity related to the WSUS Unauthenticated RCE (CVE-2025-59287).
This rule detects instances where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) spawns suspicious child processes. The suspicious child processes include certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, curl.exe, wget.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, and cmd.exe. The rule also includes a join to ensure the parent PowerShell process was launched by explorer.exe, which can help filter out some automated or administrative PowerShell activities.
Detects Python executables spawning shell interpreters such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This activity is indicative of the SNOWBASIN local HTTP bindshell proxying and executing remote commands on the host system on behalf of the attacker, as observed in UNC6692 campaigns.
Detects instances where the legitimate Obsidian application spawns shell or scripting interpreters (PowerShell, cmd, sh, bash, zsh). This behavior is associated with the REF6598 campaign, where attackers abuse the Obsidian "Shell Commands" community plugin to execute malicious code and deliver the PhantomPulse RAT.
Detects the use of powershell commands from headless ConHost window.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
This rule detects when the Obsidian application (obsidian.exe) spawns common shell or scripting interpreters such as PowerShell, cmd.exe, sh, bash, zsh, or osascript. This activity could indicate malicious code execution originating from a potentially compromised or weaponized Obsidian instance, or an attempt to leverage Obsidian's capabilities for unauthorized command execution. The inclusion of 'osascript' specifically addresses observed macOS attack chains (REF6598).
Detects the execution of the PowerShell Pester module's Build.bat script being used as a LOLBAS proxy to execute hidden payloads, as observed in LucidRook/LucidPawn malware campaigns targeting Taiwanese organizations.
Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility
Detects suspicious usage of the cmd.exe 'for /f' loop combined with the 'tokens=' parameter and a recursive directory listing.
This pattern may indicate an attempt to discover and execute system binaries dynamically, for example powershell, a technique sometimes used by attackers to evade detection.
This behavior has been observed in various malicious lnk files.
This pattern may indicate an attempt to discover and execute system binaries dynamically, for example powershell, a technique sometimes used by attackers to evade detection.
This behavior has been observed in various malicious lnk files.
Detects cmd.exe executing a batch script disguised with a .txt extension, a persistence technique used by SERPENTINE#CLOUD. The campaign delivers VenomRAT, AsyncRAT, XWorm/Violet, PureHVNC, and Brute Ratel C4 via ClickFix lures and Cloudflare tunnels.
Detects the execution of a batch file from the non-standard C:\Users\Public\Music\ directory via cmd.exe. This behavior is associated with the intermediate stage of Kimsuky campaigns where it is used to download further payloads.
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