Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
936 detections
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Detects the creation of a Windows service that points to a .sys file located in common temporary directories (Temp, Windows\Temp). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to load malicious kernel drivers, often for persistence or privilege escalation, such as in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects a specific Android sandbox escape technique where a malicious app enables Accessibility Services and Developer Options/Wireless Debugging to initiate a self-pairing ADB connection over localhost. This bypasses typical app sandbox restrictions, allowing the execution of processes with the UID 2000 (shell) context.
Detects the presence or execution of the 'Boot Time Removal Tool' (BTR.sys) driver when it originates from locations outside of the legitimate Windows Defender platform or is initiated by processes not associated with the Defender ecosystem. This behavior is indicative of potential BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks where attackers deploy known vulnerable drivers to gain kernel-mode privileges or interfere with security software.
Detects the loading of known-vulnerable signed drivers typically associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks. These drivers are frequently abused to gain kernel-mode privileges, allowing attackers to disable or terminate EDR, antivirus, and other security processes.
Detects the dllhost.exe process, running with SYSTEM privileges, loading a dynamic link library (DLL) from a user-writable path within the ProgramData directory. This behavior is consistent with the abuse of COM marshaling, specifically exploiting dangling CLSID entries to force a privileged COM host process to unmarshal and load an attacker-controlled DLL.
Detects an exploitation chain originating from a Chrome browser process, characterized by the execution of an anomalous child process followed by the creation of an executable file named 'chrome_cleanup.exe' within a short time window. This sequence is indicative of multi-stage exploitation, involving remote code execution via browser vulnerability and subsequent privilege escalation.
Detects EDRKiller.exe or WarsawKiller.exe binaries and the associated wsftprm.sys BYOVD driver used by The Gentlemen threat actor to terminate security product processes
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects the BTR.sys driver, a tool identified as being extracted from Microsoft's MpEngine.dll and repurposed for kernel-level file and registry manipulation. The rule matches on specific SHA-256 file hashes or combinations of PE metadata strings, indicating the presence of this driver on the system.
Detects potential abuse of SeLoadDriverPrivilege to load unsigned or malicious drivers, often associated with Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. The rule identifies the creation of randomized service keys used to facilitate driver loading, followed by the actual loading of a driver, or explicit command-line references to the privilege being utilized.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
Detects potential local privilege escalation via Windows ALPC (Advanced Local Procedure Call) heap-based buffer overflow by identifying a non-SYSTEM Chrome process tree spawning child processes with SYSTEM privileges. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious child binaries or paths characteristic of exploit payloads while excluding legitimate Chrome update and crash handler processes.
Detects the presence of the known vulnerable DCRCVDrv.sys kernel driver, which has been identified as being abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security processes via unauthorized IOCTL calls to ZwTerminateProcess.
Detects the installation of a new kernel-mode service using system utilities like sc.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is a common indicator of a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack intended to gain kernel-level privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation exploiting a dangling COM object registration (CLSID {E9F83CF2-E0C0-4CA7-AF01-E90C70BEF496}). It monitors for a non-SYSTEM user creating a DLL within the 'CrossDevice' ProgramData folder, followed by a scheduled task trigger, and subsequently detects 'dllhost.exe' running as SYSTEM loading that specific malicious DLL, indicating successful execution of unauthorized code with elevated privileges.
Detects a suspected exploitation attempt of CVE-2026-81000, known as TUNderflow. The detection looks for a sequence of events where a process initializes a user namespace (unshare) followed by a kernel panic or error report from the tun/tap driver originating from the same process lineage within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an integer overflow exploit leading to kernel instability.
This rule monitors for suspicious process execution (e.g., cmd, powershell) spawned from PaperCut service processes (pc-app.exe, tomcat.exe) followed by a Domain Admin group membership change on the same device within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts following the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-81578/CVE-2026-82078).
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern consistent with a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) chain. It identifies the installation of specific known vulnerable drivers (e.g., Alinubx.sys, nvfsflt64.sys) and the registration of a corresponding service (NvFsFilter), followed by the mass termination of various security software and EDR processes within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using kernel-mode privileges to disable security controls.
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