Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
191 detections
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Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems
Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings.
The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.
Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.
Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings.
The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.
Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.
Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Detects usage of the "Get-AdGroup" cmdlet to enumerate Groups within Active Directory
Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
Use this query to locate commands related to discovering highly privileged users in an environment, sometimes a precursor to ransomware
doppelpaymer
KQL
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Doppelpaymer: More human-operated ransomware. There is also a related blog.
DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. For example, they may use net.exe to run reconnaissance and find service accounts to target. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization.
The following query detects the net.exe reconnaissance method described above.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoppelPaymer!MTB&threatId=-2147205372
DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. For example, they may use net.exe to run reconnaissance and find service accounts to target. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization.
The following query detects the net.exe reconnaissance method described above.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoppelPaymer!MTB&threatId=-2147205372
This rule detects the execution of SharpView, a .NET port of PowerView, which is a popular PowerShell tool used for Active Directory reconnaissance. The rule specifically looks for the `SharpView.exe` executable or its command-line arguments containing various reconnaissance functions. These functions are commonly used by adversaries to discover information about domain computers, users, groups, trusts, policies, and network shares within an Active Directory environment.
This rule detects the execution of specific 'net group' and 'net localgroup' commands that are commonly used for Active Directory enumeration. These commands are often leveraged by adversaries to discover domain-level groups, local administrator groups, and domain administrator groups, which can help them identify privileged accounts and plan further attacks. The rule is designed to flag multiple occurrences of these commands within a 15-minute window on a single host, as a single execution might be benign, but repeated executions suggest reconnaissance activity. The detection logic specifically looks for 'net localgroup administrators', 'net group /dom', and 'net group Domain Admins /dom', optionally preceded by 'cmd /c'.
Detects group enumeration commands as identified in CISA Living off the Land pdf. Alone they may be normal but in concert, they may be worth looking into
Detects the execution of AdFind.exe, a legitimate command-line tool often used by adversaries for Active Directory reconnaissance. The rule specifically looks for renamed AdFind executables by checking for specific command-line arguments and known ImpHashes, while excluding executions of the original 'AdFind.exe' name.
This analytic detects the execution of SharpHound command-line arguments, specifically `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as SharpHound is commonly used for Active Directory enumeration, which can be a precursor to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially compromising sensitive information and critical systems.
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.
The analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query global, local and domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local or domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory or privileged accounts discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query for domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness and map out Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify and target specific domain groups, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (`soaphound.exe`) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query elevated domain or sensitive groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to identify high-privileged users within Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks aimed at compromising privileged accounts, escalating privileges, or gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
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