Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
31 detections
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Detects the use of AWS IAM Policy Simulator APIs (SimulatePrincipalPolicy, SimulateCustomPolicy), which can indicate a threat actor is enumerating permissions to find privilege escalation paths.
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Sysrv botnet evolution.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of remote code execution on a vulnerable Linux server.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of remote code execution on a vulnerable Linux server.
'This hunting query will help detect successful sign-ins from devices that are marked non-compliant along with bulk download activity.
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Attackers may attempt to get a list of accounts, groups, registration details within an environment which could help in follow-on behavior.
Best practice is to block sign ins from non-complaint devices, however if allowed monitor these events to ensure they do not lead to other risky activity.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
The following analytic detects a spike in the number of API calls made to cloud security groups by a user. It leverages data from the Change data model, focusing on successful firewall-related changes. This activity is significant because an abnormal increase in security group API calls can indicate potential malicious activity, such as unauthorized access or configuration changes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to manipulate security group settings, potentially exposing sensitive resources or disrupting network security controls.
Detects attempts by an identity to enumerate its Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) permissions. This activity is often observed in the early stages of a breach as attackers try to understand their access within a compromised Kubernetes environment. This can be achieved by querying the Kubernetes API server's SelfSubjectRulesReview API, for example, using the "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
Detects identities attempting to enumerate their Kubernetes RBAC permissions.
In the early stages of a breach, attackers will aim to list the permissions they have within the compromised environment.
In a Kubernetes cluster, this can be achieved by interacting with the API server, and querying the SelfSubjectAccessReview API via e.g. a "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
This will enumerate the Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) rules defining the compromised user's authorization.
In the early stages of a breach, attackers will aim to list the permissions they have within the compromised environment.
In a Kubernetes cluster, this can be achieved by interacting with the API server, and querying the SelfSubjectAccessReview API via e.g. a "kubectl auth can-i --list" command.
This will enumerate the Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) rules defining the compromised user's authorization.
The following analytic identifies the creation of open/public S3 buckets in AWS. It detects this activity by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events for `PutBucketAcl` actions where the access control list (ACL) grants permissions to all users or authenticated users. This activity is significant because open S3 buckets can expose sensitive data to unauthorized access, leading to data breaches. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could read, write, or fully control the contents of the bucket, potentially leading to data exfiltration or tampering.
The following analytic detects the successful deletion of a group within AWS IAM, leveraging CloudTrail IAM events. This action, while not inherently malicious, can serve as a precursor to more sinister activities, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation attempts. By monitoring for such deletions, the analytic aids in identifying potential preparatory steps towards an attack, allowing for early detection and mitigation. The identification of this behavior is crucial for a SOC to prevent the potential impact of an attack, which could include unauthorized access to sensitive resources or disruption of AWS environment operations.
This rule detects the enumeration of members within groups in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) via the Microsoft Graph API. Specifically, it looks for GET requests to the `/v1.0/groups/*/members` endpoint, which is indicative of an attempt to list group members. The rule's description notes that it is based on the behavior of the GraphRunner tool's `Get-SecurityGroups` function, suggesting it targets a specific method of enumeration.
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