Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
197 detections
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Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities associated with credential dumping and inhibiting system recovery. The rule tracks when a user account executes multiple commands related to volume shadow copies (vssadmin, rmdir, mklink) or attempts to copy sensitive registry files (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) within a 15-minute window on the same device.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
Detects the deletion of specific files associated with the indexed-btree malware loader, such as 'sharedLoad.min.js' or files within an 'extended/' directory. This behavior indicates potential anti-forensic cleanup following malicious code execution.
Detects the use of the 'wevtutil.exe' utility to clear Windows Event Logs. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disrupt logging and evade detection of their actions on a host. The rule specifically monitors for the 'cl' (clear-log) command applied to sensitive operational channels, triggering when multiple clearing operations are detected within a 5-minute window.
The following analytic identifies the use of the esxcli system auditrecords commands, which can be used to tamper with logging on an ESXi host.
This action may indicate an attempt to evade detection or hinder forensic analysis by preventing the recording of system-level audit events.
This action may indicate an attempt to evade detection or hinder forensic analysis by preventing the recording of system-level audit events.
Detects attempts to delete, truncate, or overwrite critical system logs and user command history files (such as /var/log/auth.log, syslog, or .bash_history) on Linux systems using common utilities like rm, shred, and truncate. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate system maintenance processes like logrotate and cron.
Detects the use of fsutil.exe to create a hardlink pointing to files within a user's AppData directory, specifically involving a folder named 'doxc'. This behavior is often associated with file manipulation to bypass security controls or masquerade malicious files.
Detects the termination of 'wscript.exe' using 'taskkill.exe' or PowerShell 'Stop-Process'. This behavior is commonly used by malicious loaders to stop script-based execution after a payload has been staged or executed to minimize forensic artifacts and potential detection by defenders monitoring long-running processes.
Detects attempts to delete, truncate, or overwrite critical system logs and user command history files (such as /var/log/auth.log, syslog, or .bash_history) on Linux systems using common utilities like rm, shred, and truncate. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate system maintenance processes like logrotate and cron.
Detects the creation or modification of a specific file ('libvirtlog.so.0') located in '/usr/lib/' which acts as a gating mechanism for the curlRAT malware. The detection correlates this file event with processes commonly associated with system management that are executing with command line arguments indicative of malicious activity (e.g., 'reverse', 'pty').
Detects attempts to delete, truncate, or overwrite critical system logs and user command history files (such as /var/log/auth.log, syslog, or .bash_history) on Linux systems using common utilities like rm, shred, and truncate. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate system maintenance processes like logrotate and cron.
Detects attempts to delete, truncate, or overwrite critical system logs and user command history files (such as /var/log/auth.log, syslog, or .bash_history) on Linux systems using common utilities like rm, shred, and truncate. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate system maintenance processes like logrotate and cron.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
Detects attempts to delete, truncate, or overwrite critical system logs and user command history files (such as /var/log/auth.log, syslog, or .bash_history) on Linux systems using common utilities like rm, shred, and truncate. The rule includes exclusions for legitimate system maintenance processes like logrotate and cron.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
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