Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspected Grandoreiro banking trojan command-and-control (C2) activity. The rule monitors for STUN/TURN traffic over non-browser/non-conferencing processes on port 3478, outbound MQTT connections to common cloud broker domains, and DNS lookups for specific C2-related infrastructure including geolocation checks via icanhazip.com.
Detects the execution of potential malware disguised as 'winupdate.exe' and specific network traffic associated with it. The rule identifies suspicious file paths (e.g., in AppData cache) and execution by the binary while communicating with external domains such as pastebin.com or discord.com, which are often abused for command-and-control or payload delivery.
Detects signs of persistence via suspicious scheduled task creation or local user creation/group escalation, and C2 activity involving a specific IP address or unauthorized connections to the Telegram bot API.
This rule detects network communication (DNS, connection, or traffic) with known infrastructure and specific URI paths associated with the SpectralViper threat actor. It enriches these findings by identifying if the communication originated from processes commonly associated with SpectralViper, such as OneDrive Sync services or specific Intel audio service files.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on non-standard ports that matches a specific JA3 fingerprint associated with the Sliver command and control framework. This indicates potential beaconing or C2 communication from a compromised host.
This rule detects outbound HTTP POST requests to dynv6-hosted infrastructure, specifically targeting communication patterns associated with Kimsuky campaigns. It monitors for exfiltration indicators such as the 'finalservice.php' endpoint, specific multipart form boundaries, and file indicators like 'Info.txt' used for data exfiltration.
This rule detects persistent, long-lived outbound network connections from a single device to external public IP addresses over common web ports (80 and 443). By calculating the connection count, total duration, and average interval between connections, it identifies periodic beaconing activity consistent with command and control (C2) communication patterns, such as those observed in UNC1549 TRUSTRAP traffic.
Detects the presence of a malicious Electron-based backdoor disguised as the Franz messaging application, commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign. The rule identifies indicators such as a specific C2 endpoint, automated persistence via Electron login item settings, arbitrary JavaScript execution through a 'task.e' sink, and the creation of local persistence files like 'readme.txt' and 'setup.txt'.
This rule detects potential phishing activity by monitoring for the creation of specific PDF files matching common financial-themed lures and network connections to a known malicious domain 'facture-in.pages.dev'. It tracks file-based lure indicators on local devices and network requests to identify potential initial access or delivery stages of an attack.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to the domain 'avenger-sync.live' over TLS port 443, which is associated with PamStealer stage-two command and control communication.
Detects network communication to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity such as automated data exfiltration, C2 communication, or victim status reporting, as observed in ransomware campaigns like BQTLock.
Detects network, DNS, and process-level activity associated with BQTLock ransomware command-and-control communication, specifically targeting Telegram Bot API and Discord webhook traffic originating from non-standard (non-browser/non-messaging) processes.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious outbound network connections to common Generative AI service APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral) originating from command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or python.exe instances running from temporary directories, which could indicate data exfiltration or the use of AI tools for malicious automation.
This rule detects the presence of a known malicious Chromium extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) that hijacks browser search functionality. The detection monitors for three distinct indicators: the creation of specific extension files within the Chromium directory, network communication with attacker-controlled domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws), and registry modifications that override default search settings.
This rule detects potential unauthorized remote access activity by correlating the execution or network activity of known remote access tools (Tailscale) or suspicious network patterns (DuckDNS, port 4444) with the subsequent execution or network activity of secondary RAT/remote desktop software (RustDesk, AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing an initial C2 connection followed by deploying secondary remote access tools for persistent remote control.
This rule detects high-volume data exfiltration attempts over common HTTPS ports (443 or 8443). It identifies network connections where more than 1MB of data is sent in a single connection, then aggregates these connections over one-hour intervals per device and remote IP. Finally, it flags any device that has sent a total of 50MB or more within that hour to a specific remote IP, indicating potential data exfiltration to a command and control server.
Detects HTTP traffic initiating a WebSocket protocol upgrade with a specific 'binary' subprotocol header, characteristic of the Brickstorm backdoor used by the UNC5221 threat actor for command and control (C2) communication.
Detects anomalous activity consistent with the Velvet Ant 'Operation Highland' methodology, which leverages Nginx/FastCGI to bridge external requests to internal SSH execution. The rule monitors three conditions: 1) HTTP POST requests to internal endpoints containing SSH-related command parameters; 2) suspicious Nginx configuration modifications or reload events; and 3) spawning of SSH processes by FastCGI handlers. Findings are correlated by time and entity to identify potential persistence or lateral movement mechanisms.
Detects anomalous Python activity indicative of the InvisibleFerret backdoor, specifically focusing on instances where Python processes are spawned by developer tools (node.exe, code.exe, cursor.exe), access sensitive credential/wallet files, or initiate outbound network connections on common C2 ports.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles, specifically identifying requests to /submit.php or /dpixel and the use of the default 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0;' User-Agent string.
Detects network and process execution activity involving Google or Microsoft OAuth2 token endpoints from non-browser and non-trusted processes. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempts, where malicious tools (e.g., curl, python) are used to access authentication endpoints to bypass standard user interaction.
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