Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity initiated by the WinSCP utility, or DNS queries and HTTP requests directed toward easyupload.io, a common file-sharing site. This behavior may indicate an adversary staging or exfiltrating data to an external, potentially unauthorized location.
This rule detects potentially malicious use of libcurl or curl.exe involving mTLS-related flags (e.g., --cert, --key, --cacert) in non-browser processes. It specifically flags instances where such processes perform repeated HTTPS connections to remote hosts, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-8932 related to mTLS connection reuse and authentication bypass.
Detects outbound HTTP requests matching the VPN Go clipboard-stealer exfiltration pattern: a request to /html/continue.php carrying the uid, part, total, and data query parameters used to reassemble chunked clipboard contents server-side. URI-pattern based, so it catches infrastructure rotation beyond the known IOC hosts.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform automated reconnaissance against Microsoft Graph API endpoints, specifically targeting HR, payroll, and personal user data. This activity is associated with post-compromise behaviors seen in campaigns like Payroll Pirate, where attackers utilize compromised credentials to harvest sensitive organizational information.
This rule detects network connections to specific IP addresses and ports (1259, 1269) via UDP, or the presence of a file with a specific SHA256 hash. This combination could indicate command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration using a custom UDP protocol.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
This rule detects indicators of exploitation for CVE-2026-20245 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. It monitors for the upload of malicious tenant configuration files, the creation of unauthorized 'troot' administrative accounts, subsequent lateral movement via 'su', modifications to critical system authentication files like /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow, and post-exploitation configuration exfiltration via REST API endpoints.
Detects anomalous outbound proxy requests to TON blockchain API endpoints (tonapi.io or toncenter.com) attempting to call the 'get_domain' method. This behavior is associated with the TONResolver RAT, which uses a specific, hardcoded smart contract address to dynamically resolve its C2 server hostname, effectively bypassing static domain-based security filters.
Detects network connections to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) originating from processes executing from potentially suspicious or non-standard locations (Temp, AppData, ProgramData), excluding the legitimate Telegram Desktop client. This pattern is commonly observed in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as the Millenium RAT and other malware families utilizing Telegram as a C2 channel.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to dynv6 dynamic DNS providers containing specific multipart form data patterns, including filenames like 'Info.txt', indicative of data exfiltration by the Kimsuky threat group using custom C2 staging scripts.
This rule detects indicators of activity associated with a Firefox smart_window PoC, specifically designed to exfiltrate private browsing URLs. It monitors for suspicious network connections from the Firefox process to port 8765, the creation of PoC-related scripts, and the execution of associated Node.js processes or command lines.
Detects Python processes spawned by development tools (VSCode, Cursor) or Node.js that are engaged in suspicious activities, specifically communicating with the Telegram Bot API or uploading large amounts of data, often accompanied by file staging (ZIP archive creation). This behavior is characteristic of the InvisibleFerret information stealer.
Detects the Yuta/Glove stealer malware (winupdate.exe) communicating with Discord webhooks or API endpoints. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration or receipt of interactive RAT commands, such as shell, webcam, keylogger, and system tracing.
This rule detects multi-stage behavior associated with the BQTLock ransomware, including C2 network communication, execution of loaders (PyInstaller-based) from common writable directories, suspicious child process spawning, unauthorized OpenSSH service usage potentially indicating privilege escalation, and mass file encryption indicated by both specific file extensions and bulk rename heuristics.
This rule identifies potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting recurring, consistent HTTP(S) requests from internal hosts to unknown or newly seen external destinations, characterized by stable time intervals and low variance in response sizes. The detection logic filters out common User-Agents, indicating non-browser or automated traffic often associated with malware communication.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of known malicious domains. It identifies attempts by internal systems to communicate with command and control servers, phishing sites, or other infrastructure associated with threat actors.
This rule detects activities associated with the DSCourier technique, specifically the unauthorized installation of root certificates. It monitors for PowerShell commands importing certificates into the Root store, the use of insecure curl downloads of certificate files, and unauthorized process access to the Windows Root certificate registry hive.
This rule detects network traffic directed at 'goldsky.arweave.net', a domain known to be used by the TukTuk malware as a dead-drop resolver. Adversaries often use legitimate web services like Arweave to host command-and-control (C2) configuration data, such as secondary C2 IP addresses or domains, allowing them to redirect infected hosts to backend infrastructure while masking the traffic as legitimate web communication.
Detects outbound network connections to common Large Language Model (LLM) APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) or local LLM instances (Ollama) from processes that are not standard web browsers, common IDEs, or typical development/scripting tools. This behavior may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data or interact with LLM services using unauthorized or hidden processes.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles, specifically identifying requests to /submit.php or /dpixel and the use of the default 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0;' User-Agent string.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with specific URI patterns (/rob/ or /ins/) that are indicative of TrickBot malware command and control (C2) check-in activity.
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