Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the OceanLotus (APT32) supply-chain compromise, specifically targeting the SPECTRALVIPER loader chain. It identifies the masqueraded execution of 'IntelAudioService.exe' and specific sideloading carriers (AutoCad242.exe, Genuine.exe, Updater.exe) utilizing the '-uiDll' flag, the loading of the 'DtlCrashCatch.dll' malicious module, and network beaconing to known APT32 C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network communication with known malicious command-and-control (C2) infrastructure identified by specific domains and IP addresses. The detection logic calculates a confidence score based on the presence of identified malicious C2 domains or IPs, specific suspicious cookies (zd_cs_pm, euconsent-v2), and known C2 URI paths.
Detects outbound network connections to Fastly CDN IP ranges originating from suspicious file paths (Temp or ProgramData) or common LOLBins (wscript.exe, powershell.exe) often utilized by the Kimsuky threat group for NUKESPED backdoor C2 communication.
Detects outbound web traffic directed towards common password management services (e.g., 1Password, LastPass, Bitwarden) originating from user agents associated with AI and LLM tools (e.g., OpenAI, Claude, Copilot). This combination of destinations and user agents is highly anomalous and may indicate potential credential exfiltration or interaction with automated agents acting on behalf of a user to access sensitive vault data.
Detects network traffic associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware, specifically identifying outbound WebSocket upgrade requests directed to the known command-and-control domain weatherdataai.theworkpc.com.
This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic generated by the WinHTTP library, specifically when the User-Agent identifies as WinHttp.WinHttpRequest. This pattern is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity, such as command-and-control communication or data exfiltration, originating from a process associated with an exploited Excel document (CVE-2025-60727).
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Emotet malware command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically looking for POST requests with random alphanumeric URIs (4-16 characters) and a specific Accept-Encoding header (gzip, deflate).
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike Beacon check-in activity over HTTP. It identifies incoming GET requests where the URI is abnormally short and the HTTP Referer header is missing, which are common indicators of default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests containing patterns commonly associated with Emotet command-and-control (C2) communication, specifically identifying the use of an application/octet-stream content type combined with a specific, randomized URI path structure consisting of alphanumeric segments.
Detects the deployment of AdaptixC2 agents by monitoring for suspicious rundll32.exe process executions indicative of reflective DLL injection. This includes rundll32.exe loading DLLs from suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) with potential reflective loader flags or exported functions, often triggered by parent processes like msiexec.exe or consent.exe. The rule also monitors for direct outbound network connections from rundll32.exe to known AdaptixC2 command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects authentication and Office activity where User-Agent strings match known malicious, reconnaissance, scanning, or C2 tool fingerprints. Helps identify automated attacks, credential stuffing, and adversary tooling.
Detects evidence of AsyncRAT infection involving process hollowing into RegAsm.exe. The rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell activity involving specific artifacts ('cap.ps1', 'ConsoleApp1') used to perform reflective assembly loading, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe, and subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from RegAsm.exe to known C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects potential credential theft from web browsers (Edge/Chrome) by monitoring access to the 'Login Data' SQLite database file. It correlates file access events with subsequent outbound HTTPS connections to non-Microsoft and non-Google domains initiated by the same browser process within a 10-minute window, which is indicative of exfiltration of stolen browser credentials.
Detects indicators associated with the 'smart_window' campaign targeting Firefox, which attempts to exfiltrate browser history and page content via unauthorized registry modifications, malicious file artifacts, and specific network communication patterns to localhost or external URLs.
Detects instances where PowerShell is spawned by cmd.exe and includes command-line arguments indicative of a reverse shell, such as network socket creation, hidden execution, or encoded commands. This pattern often follows suspicious parent processes or activities such as keystroke injection.
Detects two distinct suspicious patterns indicative of OAuth consent abuse and browser-based credential theft. The first pattern identifies non-Microsoft script interpreters or binaries initiating network connections to Microsoft's OAuth endpoints. The second pattern identifies unauthorized processes attempting to access or modify sensitive browser data files (e.g., 'Login Data', 'Cookies') which are typically reserved for browser-specific processes.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform system reconnaissance commands and exfiltrate the collected data using HTTP POST requests (curl or Invoke-WebRequest). This behavior is often associated with post-compromise activity and is flagged with higher severity when initiated from an IIS worker process or when using encoded PowerShell arguments.
Detects Python processes spawned from development tools (Node.js, VS Code, Cursor) that perform suspicious file access to browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, cookies.sqlite) and subsequently initiate significant outbound network POST requests, characteristic of browser-based credential harvesting and exfiltration.
This rule detects the use of the JSON-RPC 'eth_call' method by a non-browser process during network communication. It specifically looks for network connection events where the initiating process is not a common web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) and the network traffic or command line contains the string '"method":"eth_call"'. This behavior is often associated with malware or cryptocurrency-related threats attempting dynamic command or address resolution.
Detects DcRAT (Operation DragonReturn) malware beaconing to a known C2 IP address (223.26.63.40) following the execution of suspicious sideloaded binaries, specifically 'Mixed Reality.exe' or 'COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe', which then inject malicious code into svchost.exe.
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