Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious multi-stage infection sequence associated with DcRAT, characterized by a process spawning a child with references to image files (.jpg/.jpeg), followed by the loading of an unsigned DLL from the same directory, and culminating in a TLS network connection within a narrow time window.
Detects the export of Microsoft Teams messages, transcripts, recordings, and chat retrieval activities, particularly when performed via the Graph API. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for specific operation names in SaaS audit logs and flags potentially malicious user agents commonly associated with automation tools (e.g., python-requests, axios, go-http, curl, wget, powershell, httpx, aiohttp, node). It also categorizes user agents by risk level (HIGH, MEDIUM, NONE) and extracts relevant details like device IDs, IP addresses, and chat information. This activity can indicate post-compromise attackers using stolen tokens to silently export chat history.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from Langflow-related web service processes (langflow, uvicorn, gunicorn, python). It detects the spawning of unexpected OS-level child processes (like shell interpreters), creation of suspicious files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm), and outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with recent Langflow exploitation attempts (CVE-2026-33017).
This rule detects network connections or DNS requests to the domain 'mitarchive.info', which is associated with known malicious activity. Monitoring for traffic to this domain can help identify hosts that may be compromised or attempting to communicate with an attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects DNS resolution and network connections to known infrastructure associated with the StegoAd campaign, including exfiltration (mitarchive.info) and C2 (liveupdt.com, dealctr.com, ipaglov.com) domains. The rule monitors activity from common browser and scripting engine processes.
Detects post-exploitation activities related to the PHP 8.5.7 CVE-2025-15661 StreamBucket SOAP vulnerability. This rule monitors for PHP worker processes spawning shells, writing executable files to suspicious directories, executing system binaries on Windows, or initiating outbound network connections on non-standard ports, including specific proof-of-concept markers.
This rule detects the presence of Phoenix malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its command and control (C2) infrastructure. It correlates file events with known malware hashes and network events with known C2 IP addresses.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of known malicious domains. It identifies attempts by internal systems to communicate with command and control servers, phishing sites, or other infrastructure associated with threat actors.
Detects network connections from suspicious or unexpected processes to common public webhook and automation services, which may indicate data exfiltration or automated C2 communication.
This rule detects network activity associated with the easy-day-js Mastra npm supply chain attack. Specifically, it identifies data exfiltration over TLS to a secondary C2 server (23.254.164.123:443) and the download of a stage-2 payload from a primary C2 server (23.254.164.92:8000) via HTTP, looking for the URI '/update/49890878'.
This rule detects anomalous network connections or DNS queries to known Ethereum RPC infrastructure providers (Infura, Alchemy, Cloudflare-eth) or ports/domains associated with Ethereum mainnet activity. It specifically targets processes other than common browsers or known blockchain clients, as well as Java-based processes performing DNS lookups for these domains. This behavior is indicative of potential 'EtherHiding' techniques where malicious code or data is hidden within blockchain transactions or distributed via blockchain infrastructure.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections initiated by powershell.exe occurring within 5 minutes of an inbound network connection on TCP port 1313, a pattern indicative of the exploitation of the Remote Mouse unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability and subsequent establishment of a reverse shell.
Detects network activity associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically identifying C2 communication tunneled over WebRTC/STUN (port 3478) or MQTT (Azure/Google Cloud services) originating from processes executing out of the AppData\Local directory. This behavior aligns with Grandoreiro's known DLL side-loading mechanism where legitimate but vulnerable binaries are used to load malicious libraries.
Detects suspicious interactions with Google Cloud Pub/Sub APIs occurring shortly after an OAuth2 token request, specifically when the activity is performed by processes other than standard Google Cloud SDK tools (gcloud, gsutil, etc.). This behavior may indicate an attempt to utilize stolen OAuth tokens to exfiltrate or manipulate data within a GCP environment.
Detects suspicious PowerShell processes executing common system reconnaissance commands (e.g., whoami, net group, ipconfig) combined with network communication indicators, specifically HTTP method or body flags, or connections to known suspicious IP addresses.
Detects unauthorized HTTPS POST requests to sensitive GitHub API endpoints (gists, repository contents, user emails) originating from standard command-line tools like curl, node, and PowerShell. Additionally, it identifies suspicious git push operations initiated from within node-based installation scripts, which is indicative of credential harvesting and exfiltration behaviors exhibited by the Miasma worm.
Detects outbound HTTP POST beaconing to known malicious C2 infrastructure (83.142.209.214) associated with the lambsys cryptominer campaign. The rule specifically looks for HTTP requests to /status.php or /setup_status.php utilizing the default Go HTTP client User-Agent, a common indicator of this specific malware.
USB worm and loader leveraging living-off-the-land binaries
USB worm and loader leveraging living-off-the-land binaries
LockBit C2Beacon
YARA
High-velocity ransomware-as-a-service with aggressive leak-site extortion
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
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