Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents to identify processes that are not typically associated with cloud storage and synchronization software initiating network connections on port 443 to popular cloud providers (OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox). This behavior is often indicative of data exfiltration to cloud storage services or potential command and control communication disguised as web traffic.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents to identify processes that are not typically associated with cloud storage and synchronization software initiating network connections on port 443 to popular cloud providers (OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox). This behavior is often indicative of data exfiltration to cloud storage services or potential command and control communication disguised as web traffic.
This rule detects when an Nginx web server proxies HTTP POST requests to FastCGI backends located on internal network subnets (RFC1918) or local unix sockets. Such behavior often indicates exploitation attempts targeting internal FastCGI interfaces, which should typically not be reachable directly from the internet-facing web server.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to identified APT Command and Control (C2) IP address ranges over common ports (8080, 443, 21, 22, 23, 25, 445). This traffic pattern is indicative of unauthorized external communication commonly associated with malware or adversary activity.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
Detects high-frequency access to sensitive web paths (e.g., /admin, /vault, /credentials) from common web browsers on a device. This activity may indicate malicious credential harvesting, administrative panel enumeration, or sensitive data exfiltration performed by an adversary or malicious browser extension.
Detects browser processes connecting to internal IP addresses followed by a connection to an external (non-whitelisted) destination within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration, where a web browser is used to access internal resources before transferring data to an external site.
This rule detects potential JDY botnet activity characterized by host fingerprinting and data exfiltration patterns. It looks for repeated POST requests to specific URI patterns ('/gate', '/report', '/scan') accompanied by a significant volume of outbound data, indicative of automated C2 communication or data staging. The rule aggregates metrics per host to identify high-volume exfiltration patterns and calculates a risk score based on the frequency of requests and the diversity of destination IPs.
Detects instances where a process, other than standard browsers or common system applications, loads 'WINHTTP.dll' and subsequently initiates outbound HTTPS connections. This behavior is often indicative of custom malware or specialized tooling, such as the NUKESPED/Kimsuky framework, using direct API calls for command and control (C2) communication to bypass standard application-based network filtering.
This rule identifies potential use of the Tor network by detecting network connections to common Tor relay ports (9001, 9030, 9050, 9051, 9150) that are external to internal subnets, or by identifying DNS requests for .onion domains.
Detects unusual processes making multiple connections to Google Sheets or OAuth2 APIs within a short timeframe, excluding known browsers and Google applications. This could indicate unauthorized data access, exfiltration, or command and control activity.
Detects the DRAYN malware which masquerades as a VSCode or Microsoft installer. The rule looks for a silent 7ZipSfx installation that drops a temporary file (agent.tmp), performs C2 communication over WebSockets to a specific IP address (34.244.31.76), and establishes persistence via a RunOnce registry key using a modified vcredist_x86.exe execution.
This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic generated by the WinHTTP library, specifically when the User-Agent identifies as WinHttp.WinHttpRequest. This pattern is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity, such as command-and-control communication or data exfiltration, originating from a process associated with an exploited Excel document (CVE-2025-60727).
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of Emotet Epoch 4 and 5 C2 communication. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns, the presence of a 'Cookie' header, and a base64-encoded request body exceeding 80 characters, which are indicative of Emotet malware beaconing activity.
Detects TLS/SSL traffic patterns characteristic of Metasploit Meterpreter reverse HTTPS command-and-control communication, specifically targeting the use of default, self-signed certificates with a subject line containing a bare wildcard (CN=*) in the common name field, a common artifact of unconfigured Metasploit payloads.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic containing TLS certificates with common names associated with known command-and-control (C2) frameworks like Metasploit and Empire. These frameworks often use self-signed certificates with default or easily identifiable issuer names when establishing C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on high ports where the TLS SNI header consists of a 8-20 character random alphanumeric string. This pattern is indicative of default configurations for Metasploit Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS payloads attempting to establish a Command and Control connection.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate Flows that utilize non-Microsoft domains for HTTP or webhook connectors. Adversaries may abuse Power Automate to automate exfiltration or command-and-control tasks by connecting workflows to external malicious endpoints.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to external networks that match a known Emotet C2 traffic pattern. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests using an 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Content-Type and a URI structure consisting of randomized alphanumeric segments (4-20 characters long). This structure is characteristic of Emotet's communication with its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot malware command and control (C2) activity. The rule identifies a specific combination of a hardcoded User-Agent string ('Trident/7.0') and a URI pattern consisting of 4 to 32 alphanumeric characters ending in .php.
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