Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
Identifies the execution of wget.exe or curl.exe with command-line flags indicative of file uploads (specifically archives like zip, rar, or 7z), which may be used by adversaries to exfiltrate staged data to remote infrastructure.
Detects the execution of a Cloudflare tunnel (cloudflared) binary that has been renamed to evade detection (e.g., svchost.exe), commonly used to establish persistent C2 tunnels.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying non-browser processes that initiate regular, sustained outbound network connections over port 443. It aggregates connection data by hour and calculates metrics such as average frequency and standard deviation to identify consistent, periodic communication patterns characteristic of C2 agents while excluding common legitimate web browsers.
This rule detects processes other than standard web browsers performing network connections that coincide with OAuth token acquisition activities (POST requests containing 'access_token' in the response body). This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or unauthorized programmatic access to OAuth-protected resources.
Detects network connections to Filen.io cloud storage initiated by processes other than common web browsers. This behavior is often associated with the use of command-line tools or scripts for unauthorized file exfiltration or data staging.
Detects Microsoft Outlook spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) followed by a network connection originating from that interpreter within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious macro execution or exploit delivery via email attachments leading to command-and-control activity.
This rule identifies instances where python.exe or python3.exe executes from non-standard system paths and establishes an outbound network connection to external (non-private/non-loopback) IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, as legitimate applications typically execute from protected program file directories, while adversaries often execute unauthorized binaries from temporary or user-writable locations to initiate command and control (C2) communication.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying non-browser processes that initiate regular, sustained outbound network connections over port 443. It aggregates connection data by hour and calculates metrics such as average frequency and standard deviation to identify consistent, periodic communication patterns characteristic of C2 agents while excluding common legitimate web browsers.
Detects network connections to the Telegram API (api.telegram.org) from processes identified as LOLBins or residing in suspicious, potentially writable locations such as Temp, AppData, or user-defined directories. This activity is often indicative of C2 communication or data exfiltration by malware bypassing standard messaging client restrictions.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious outbound network connections to common Generative AI service APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral) originating from command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or python.exe instances running from temporary directories, which could indicate data exfiltration or the use of AI tools for malicious automation.
Detects instances where a non-standard browser process accesses sensitive browser credential files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, key4.db) and simultaneously establishes a network connection to Discord or transmits data to a Discord webhook. This pattern is consistent with infostealer malware attempting to exfiltrate cached credentials via external services.
This rule detects outbound network connections to common webhook and temporary storage services (e.g., discord.com webhooks, webhook.site, pipedream.net) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers. Such behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration, command-and-control (C2) communication, or malicious script activity using these services to bypass traditional network defenses.
Detects npm package installation activity or network communication originating from npm-related processes that involve identified malicious packages, maintainers, or scopes associated with supply chain attacks. Specifically monitors for the '@withgoogle' scope squatting, as well as specific malicious package names and maintainer accounts, and tracks related outbound network connections to suspicious C2 domains.
Detects malicious activity associated with npm supply chain compromise, including execution of known malicious npm lifecycle scripts, DNS queries to suspected C2 domains, and unauthorized access to sensitive developer credential files (such as .npmrc, .aws/credentials, and SSH keys) by Node.js processes.
Detects the presence and activity of Tailscale VPN, including process execution, command-line arguments, network connections to Tailscale infrastructure, and communications within the Tailscale CGNAT address range (100.64.0.0/10). This rule identifies the potential use of Tailscale for tunneling or remote access, which may be unauthorized in some environments.
This rule detects suspicious network connections made by processes (excluding legitimate EDR processes like mssense.exe and senseir.exe) to URLs commonly associated with EDR command and control (C2) infrastructure. This could indicate an attempt by an adversary to communicate with or manipulate the EDR agent.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe executes with missing or minimal DLL arguments and subsequently establishes outbound network connections. This behavior is uncommon in legitimate Windows operations and has been observed during ACR Stealer infections, including executions originating from remote SMB shares and memory-loaded payloads.
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the SPECTRALVIPER C2 framework. This rule identifies outbound HTTP GET requests targeting known C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses, while correlating the traffic with specific browser user agents and cookie patterns indicative of this actor.
Detects HTTP traffic initiating a WebSocket protocol upgrade with a specific 'binary' subprotocol header, characteristic of the Brickstorm backdoor used by the UNC5221 threat actor for command and control (C2) communication.
Detects HTTP traffic destined for the 1rpc.io Ethereum node gateway containing 'eth_call' in the request body, which is indicative of EtherRAT malware using blockchain infrastructure for command and control (C2) resolution.
Page 124 of 190