Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity and DNS resolutions related to the tonapi.io domain initiated by unexpected processes. This pattern is indicative of the TONResolver RAT, which abuses TON smart contracts as a mechanism for command and control (C2).
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns communicating with the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) from non-official Telegram processes. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) activity by analyzing request frequency, specific API method usage (e.g., getUpdates, sendMessage), and beaconing-like behavior.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with LegionLoader malware, specifically tracking files and processes interacting with the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. It triggers on the staging of '_socket.pyd', execution of Python interpreters from this directory, and associated C2 communication attempts with the domain 'birdeemusic.com'.
Detects Python scripts or interpreters executing network connections while residing in or interacting with non-standard, potentially suspicious directories or domains. This rule specifically monitors for Python processes (python.exe, pythonw.exe) associated with 'Traiolx Custom Utils', paths within 'AppData\Roaming\python', or network interactions with 'birdeemusic.com' and a specific hardcoded IP address, which are indicative of potential beaconing or command and control activity.
Detects Node.js processes initiating network connections to remote destination port 2222. This specific port and behavior pattern are known to be used by the Miasma botnet as a fallback C2 channel or for SSH-based remote access when standard communication ports are blocked or monitored.
This rule detects instances of the Python interpreter (python.exe) executing from the AppData\Roaming directory, which is a common persistence location for malware. It further correlates these process events with outbound network connections to external (non-private/non-RFC1918) IP addresses, identifying potential Command and Control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Detects bash processes executing commands that combine AWS identity verification with outbound exfiltration using curl. The pattern specifically monitors for the use of 'aws sts get-caller-identity' followed by an immediate HTTP POST transmission of data (indicated by '-d @-'), which is characteristic of attackers exfiltrating captured cloud environment metadata or temporary credentials.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Amazon Q or AWS Language Server components (e.g., amazon-q, aws-lsp-server). The rule specifically flags behavior associated with the loading of MCP server configurations, potential unauthorized access to AWS credentials, or network data exfiltration attempts through commonly abused binaries like shell interpreters, python, or curl/wget when these are not signed by Amazon.
Detects outbound network connections to a known Djinn Stealer C2 IP address (96.126.130.126) on port 58942, utilizing the specific User-Agent 'telemetry-client/1.0' and 'application/octet-stream' content type. This behavior is indicative of data exfiltration of encrypted/compressed archives.
Detects network activity associated with Djinn Stealer malware, identifying either direct connections to a known command-and-control (C2) server or HTTP exfiltration attempts using a characteristic User-Agent string and binary content type.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the 'SmartWindow' browser exploitation technique, specifically: Firefox communicating with the local SmartWindow PoC C2 API on port 8765, Firefox spawning unexpected child processes, or unauthorized processes accessing Firefox's 'places.sqlite' database to harvest browsing history or private session data.
Detects network activity and process behavior consistent with the use of the Tor network for command and control (C2), specifically targeting patterns associated with The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). The rule identifies direct execution of Tor processes, unauthorized connections to common Tor SOCKS proxy ports, and specific network communication with known malicious infrastructure linked to The Gentlemen Go-based backdoor.
Detects suspicious network-related activity initiated by common command-line utilities when spawned as child processes of Visual Studio Code (Code.exe). This pattern is often indicative of automated script execution, malware staging, or adversary activity following code repository manipulation, particularly when preceded by a git clone operation within a 15-minute window.
Detects specific suspicious processes (MediumInstStart.exe or pcl2bmp.exe) initiating network connections or DNS requests to identified malicious IP addresses (188.208.141.177) or domains (couldinstallup.com, workdrive.zoho.com, zohoapis.com) within a one-hour window. These processes are indicative of potential malware or unauthorized C2 activity.
This rule monitors for known malicious activities associated with a specific Go-based backdoor. It detects network connections to a known command-and-control IP (81.177.215.15) on port 9443, as well as host-based behaviors including suspicious WMI-based system information discovery and the execution of cmd.exe spawned by a specific suspicious process named MediumInstStart.exe.
Detects instances where scripting processes (Python, Node.js) accessed SSH key files or configuration files and subsequently initiated an outbound network connection within 60 seconds, which may indicate potential exfiltration of credentials or unauthorized access.
Detects web access logs matching the specific 'wp_debug_session' parameter used by the ErrTraffic webshell to communicate with compromised servers. This rule identifies HTTP requests containing both 'wp_debug_session=' and 'mode=php' in the URI query string, which are indicators of ErrTraffic webshell activity.
Detects network traffic associated with the EvilTokens phishing kit's 'killed' gate check mechanism. The kit GETs /api/device/gate/<PAGE_ID> with the ngrok-skip-browser-warning header. When the backend returns a killed flag, the phishing page wipes the DOM and renders a fake 'Page Not Found - Microsoft' error to evade analysis or block specific victims.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including aggregator/C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes. Monitoring these connections can help identify compromised systems or active exploitation attempts related to FortiBleed.
Detects host-level evidence of DRAYN malware activity by correlating outbound network connections using a specific websocket-sharp User-Agent to a known command-and-control (C2) IP address with the execution of PowerShell commands performing system UUID fingerprinting (Win32_ComputerSystem).
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes. Monitoring these connections can help identify compromised systems communicating with FortiBleed infrastructure.
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