Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
This rule detects the execution of a Windows command shell (cmd.exe) spawned by Windows Explorer occurring within a 10-second window of network traffic identified as socket.io or websocket communication. This behavior often suggests a potential reverse shell or C2 connection where a command shell is invoked through or in conjunction with web-based communication channels.
Detects the execution of cmd.exe triggered by explorer.exe shortly after a network connection is established to the Peyara Remote Mouse service on TCP port 1313. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote command execution via synthetic keystroke injection, bypassing standard interactive session protections.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes.
Detects network traffic associated with DcRAT malware, specifically monitoring outbound connections on port 2671 to external non-private IP addresses, or directly to known malicious infrastructure (223.26.63.40). The rule also identifies potential beaconing behavior by analyzing connection intervals and standard deviation, and flags activity originating from specific autonomous system ranges (AS152194) linked to the threat actor's infrastructure.
This rule detects outbound network connections to common tunneling and proxy services (Cloudflare Tunnel, Cloudflare Workers, and Microsoft Dev Tunnels). These services are frequently abused by threat actors, such as the Gamaredon Group (ACTINIUM), to establish command-and-control (C2) channels and tunnel traffic to evade network-based detection systems.
Detects unusual FTP command sequences where common file listing commands (LIST, NLST, MLSD) are used without specifying a filename parameter, and the RemoteUrl length is unusually short, potentially indicating reconnaissance or an attempt to exploit a vulnerability like Squidbleed. The rule specifically excludes common file extensions to reduce false positives.
This rule detects network connections and DNS requests to specific domains associated with Unistream SDK and other known BadBlocker malware infrastructure, often linked to malicious browser extensions such as Adblock for YouTube and related variants.
Detects network activity associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware infrastructure. This includes downloading MSI installers or server scripts from GitHub, as well as WebSocket C2 communications with the onrender.com platform.
This rule detects network activity associated with the Bluekit PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) BitM (Browser-in-the-Browser) C2 infrastructure. It monitors for connections to known malicious domains, the use of WebSocket upgrades over TLS, and the presence of 'rrweb' (a DOM recording library) in request URIs, which are indicative of browser-in-the-browser phishing C2 traffic.
Detects network communication associated with the Bluekit phishing framework and the use of the rrweb library to capture web sessions, including WebSocket upgrade attempts which may indicate unauthorized user activity monitoring or credential harvesting.
Detects outbound network connections to known blockchain API endpoints originating from developer scripting runtimes (e.g., node.exe, python.exe). This pattern is consistent with attackers using blockchain transactions as a dead-drop mechanism for retrieving encrypted second-stage payloads, a technique observed in supply chain attacks targeting developers.
This rule monitors for network connections from common developer-related processes (e.g., node, python, npm) to known blockchain RPC endpoints, followed by a subsequent network connection within 5 minutes that is not directed at those RPC endpoints or common developer infrastructure (e.g., GitHub, NPM, PyPI). This pattern is often indicative of potential malicious activity, such as a compromised development environment performing beaconing or staging data after interacting with blockchain services.
Detects DNS resolutions for major AI/LLM provider domains (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic, Google AI) originating from processes that are not common, known browsers or development tools. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious applications or malware using AI APIs for automated tasks, such as content exfiltration or sophisticated C2 communication.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line tools like curl, wget, or PowerShell to query OAuth/token-related endpoints (e.g., /token, oauth, access_token). The rule filters out expected parent processes (e.g., shells, IDEs, common build tools) to identify potentially malicious attempts to steal application access tokens.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration activity where PowerShell is used to compress files followed by an outbound network connection to a known C2 IP address and port. It also monitors for direct outbound connections from PowerShell involving suspicious keywords indicative of data staging and exfiltration such as 'Compress-Archive', 'client.zip', and 'UPLOAD'.
Detects the macOS.Gaslight Rust-based implant receiving and executing backdoor commands (e.g., shell, kill, upload, persistence) via the Telegram Bot API. The rule correlates outbound network connections to api.telegram.org with subsequent process execution patterns typical of command dispatch (such as execvp or posix_spawnp).
Detects outbound network connections to a known malicious IP (83.142.209.214) associated with Lambsys cryptominer activity. The rule specifically monitors for HTTP POST requests to '/status.php' or '/setup_status.php' using the default 'Go-http-client/1.1' User-Agent, indicating a C2 beaconing pattern.
This rule detects activities associated with a specific malicious browser extension, including the presence of its files on disk, execution of browsers with the extension ID in the command line, and network connections to known malicious or typosquatted domains (perplexity-ai.online, extension.tilda.ws) used for C2 or exfiltration.
Detects DNS queries to known StegoAd command-and-control domains 'liveupdt.com' and 'dealctr.com'. These domains are used by the StegoAd campaign to deliver steganographic payloads and push malicious JavaScript to compromised browser extensions.
Detects network connections originating from standard web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Chromium, Opera) to the domain 'perplexity-ai.online', which is indicative of potential command and control or unauthorized data exfiltration activity.
This rule detects outbound network connections to the typosquatted domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. This domain is associated with a malicious Chromium extension masquerading as a 'Search for Perplexity AI' tool, which uses this domain for search-traffic interception and command-and-control (C2) exfiltration.
Page 129 of 190