Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for large outbound network data transfers (greater than 10MB) over standard web ports (80/443) initiated by processes typically associated with office productivity applications (e.g., WinWord, Excel, Outlook) or credential dumping tools (lsass.exe). It further correlates this activity with preceding network connections to common directory service ports (LDAP/Global Catalog) on the same host, indicating potential credential collection followed by data exfiltration.
Detects HTTP POST beaconing behavior to known infrastructure associated with Atlas RAT and ValleyRAT malware, linked to TA4922 campaigns. The rule monitors for repeated connections to specific C2 IP addresses on TCP port 886.
macOS malware used by JINX-0164 against cryptocurrency developers
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
macOS malware used by JINX-0164 against cryptocurrency developers
This rule detects network connections to the Telegram API (api.telegram.org) initiated by specific processes that are typically associated with scripting or unauthorized execution (BQT.exe, start.exe, python.exe, pythonw.exe), while explicitly excluding common web browsers. This behavior is often indicative of automated command-and-control (C2) communication or data exfiltration using Telegram as a transport layer.
Open-source derived remote access trojan with plugin architecture
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Detects the execution of known debugger/disassembler tools (Ghidra, dnSpy, x64dbg) that exhibit suspicious network behavior. The rule specifically looks for these tools initiating network connections to destinations outside of their official update or project domains shortly after execution, and filters out known good hash signatures.
This rule monitors for outbound network connections to 'graph.microsoft.com' initiated by processes that are either unsigned or not digitally signed by Microsoft. It further correlates these connections with proxy logs to identify processes utilizing non-standard or unexpected User-Agents. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious activity attempting to masquerade as legitimate Microsoft services or using the Microsoft Graph API for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of known debugger/disassembler tools (Ghidra, dnSpy, x64dbg) that exhibit suspicious network behavior. The rule specifically looks for these tools initiating network connections to destinations outside of their official update or project domains shortly after execution, and filters out known good hash signatures.
This rule detects processes other than standard web browsers performing network connections that coincide with OAuth token acquisition activities (POST requests containing 'access_token' in the response body). This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or unauthorized programmatic access to OAuth-protected resources.
This rule identifies potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting recurring, consistent HTTP(S) requests from internal hosts to unknown or newly seen external destinations, characterized by stable time intervals and low variance in response sizes. The detection logic filters out common User-Agents, indicating non-browser or automated traffic often associated with malware communication.
Detects Microsoft Outlook spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) followed by a network connection originating from that interpreter within a 5-minute window. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious macro execution or exploit delivery via email attachments leading to command-and-control activity.
This rule identifies instances where python.exe or python3.exe executes from non-standard system paths and establishes an outbound network connection to external (non-private/non-loopback) IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, as legitimate applications typically execute from protected program file directories, while adversaries often execute unauthorized binaries from temporary or user-writable locations to initiate command and control (C2) communication.
Detects repeated outbound network connections (HTTPS or HTTP) originating from QEMU emulator processes (qemu-system-x86_64 or qemu-system-i386). This activity is indicative of C2 beaconing or post-exploitation traffic originating from a virtualized guest hidden on a host system.
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