Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies active Command and Control communication from infected hosts to known Red Lamassu infrastructure by monitoring network connections to specific C2 domains.
Detects network connections originating from the Vulkan loader executable (vulkaninfo.exe) over port 1234, indicative of RomulusLoader C2 activity associated with TA4922.
Detects network connections to the decoy C2 domain api.anthropic.com originating from development runtimes like Node.js, Python, or Bun. The Miasma/Shai-Hulud malware actively uses this specific domain as a decoy to obscure its data exfiltration and C2 traffic.
Detects co-occurrence of MicrosoftSystem64 binary execution and DNS queries to huggingface.co from the same host within a 5-minute window. MicrosoftSystem64 is a DPRK-attributed (FAMOUS CHOLLIMA / Contagious Interview) multi-platform RAT delivered via malicious npm packages that exfiltrates stolen credentials, screenshots, and wallet data to attacker-controlled HuggingFace datasets. SafeDep confirmed the exfiltration pipeline was actively operating with real victims as of May 28, 2026.
This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
Detects UDP multicast traffic to 224.0.0.255 on port 31339. This traffic is normally used by the PassMark Endpoint utility (BurnInTest) for peer discovery, but has been observed being repurposed by threat actors such as UAC-0184 to establish a stealthy command and control channel.
Detects the specific User-Agent string 'NSIS_InetLoad (Mozilla)' associated with the SessionGate multi-stage loader during its command and control (C2) check-ins. SessionGate is delivered via impersonated open-source tooling websites and gated TDS redirection chains.
Detects network connections originating from the Vulkan loader executable (`vulkaninfo.exe`) over port 1234. This behavior is indicative of TA4922 utilizing RomulusLoader to establish command and control communications and retrieve secondary payloads, such as RMM tools.
This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
This rule detects processes making a high volume of network connections (10 or more within an hour) to URLs containing 'release' or 'download'. This behavior can be indicative of malware downloading additional components, updates, or exfiltrating data, but could also be legitimate software updates or large file transfers.
Detects network connections to Azure App Services domains containing healthcare or service-themed keywords originating from non-browser processes. Obsidian Sandstorm utilizes these tailored subdomains for C2 communications to blend in with legitimate enterprise network traffic.
This rule detects potential Agent Tesla malware activity by correlating process execution with network connections. It looks for processes named 'agenttesla.exe', 'atsvc.exe', or 'atservice.exe' that execute with command-line arguments indicative of data exfiltration (e.g., 'smtp', 'ftp', 'http.post', 'exfil'). The rule then correlates these process events with outbound network connections to non-private IP addresses, flagging instances where multiple process runs and multiple network connections occur within a 30-minute window.
Detects wscript.exe initiating outbound network connections to non-standard HTTP ports (ports other than 80, 443, or 8080), which aligns with JS.MonoGlyphRAT's C2 communication profile. This rule specifically looks for successful network connections from wscript.exe to remote IPs that are not private and are not using standard web ports, indicating potential command and control activity.
Detects network traffic over TCP port 886, which is specifically used by Atlas RAT for command and control check-ins, plugin downloads, and encrypted data exfiltration in TA4922 campaigns.
This rule detects network connections originating from clients using a specific User-Agent string associated with the SessionGate malware. The User-Agent string 'NSIS_InetLoad' combined with 'Mozilla' is indicative of SessionGate C2 check-ins, leveraging the NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) InetLoad plugin. The rule searches across common proxy and web logs for this pattern.
Detects network connections to domains associated with Argamal RAT command and control infrastructure.
This rule detects potential C2 beaconing behavior by identifying devices that make a high number of periodic outbound connections (20 or more within an hour) to a single external IP address on common web and C2-related ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 4444, 5555, 8888, 9001). The rule summarizes these connections by device, remote IP, and initiating process, highlighting sustained communication patterns indicative of command and control.
Havoc C2 Agent Beacon Detected
Suricata
This rule detects beaconing activity associated with the Havoc C2 agent. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/login' URI, with a User-Agent header of 'Mozilla/5.0', and a data size between 101 and 499 bytes. A threshold of 10 such events within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating potential command and control communication.
Detects potential WordPress malware activity that abuses Steam Community profile comments as a command-and-control (C2) channel. The malware retrieves encoded payloads hidden in Steam profile comments using invisible Unicode characters, decodes malicious URLs, and downloads additional JavaScript payloads. This rule identifies outbound connections from WordPress servers to Steam Community URLs or known malicious infrastructure associated with this campaign.
This rule detects a high volume of successful network connections to common web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains keywords like 'version' or 'software'. This pattern could indicate an adversary performing reconnaissance to identify installed software and their versions, potentially looking for vulnerabilities or specific applications to target. The threshold of 10 such activities within an hour for a single device is set to flag anomalous behavior.
Detects web requests containing the specific user-agent or custom secret headers used by the Moika campaign beacon to retrieve its stage 2 payload.
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