Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
POW Proxy-over-Web Custom HTTP Headers
Cortex XDR
Detects HTTP traffic containing the custom POST headers used by the SHADOW-AETHER-064 'POW' (Proxy over Web) tool to encapsulate SOCKS5 traffic inside HTTP requests forwarded through JSP webshells. The full header set per Trend Micro's analysis is X-Act, X-Sid, X-Host, X-Port, and X-Status. The X-Act header carries one of five specific command values (CONNECT, SEND, RECV, DISCONNECT, PING) which provides an additional fidelity boost. The combination of two or more of these headers in a single HTTP transaction is exclusive to the POW tool.
Detects DNS queries to attacker-controlled infrastructure used by the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
The domain git-tanstack.com is attacker-controlled. The filev2.getsession.org endpoint is used
for credential exfiltration via the Session protocol.
This suite of rules detects various activities associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, including the execution of its payload via bun, network connections to its exfiltration domain, attempts by Node.js or Bun processes to access AWS IMDS for credential theft, access to local HashiCorp Vault instances, identification of known malicious script file hashes, and the installation of its specific malicious GitHub dependency.
Detects instances where 'curl.exe' is used to download content related to Node.js, specifically looking for 'nodejs.org' or 'node-v' in the command line. This could indicate an adversary attempting to download and execute a Node.js runtime or related tools on a compromised system.
Detects network connections to known REF6598 staging and command-and-control infrastructure, including a hardcoded staging IP and PHANTOMPULSE panel domains. This provides a high-fidelity signal of active PHANTOMPULSE infections and potential data exfiltration attempts.
Detects Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain malware (router_init.js / router_runtime.js / tanstack_runner.js)
Detects DNS requests or network connections to the typosquatted domain and hardcoded IP associated with the DAEMON Tools supply chain attack, as well as additional network relations tied to the installer.
CL-STA-1132 Specific User-Agent
Cortex XDR
Detects network traffic utilizing the highly specific and anomalous User-Agent string used by CL-STA-1132 during the exploitation and post-exploitation of CVE-2026-0300.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known PhantomRaven command and control (C2) infrastructure, including specific domains and IP addresses. The rule also specifically identifies potential data exfiltration attempts to the '/mozbra.php' endpoint.
Detects network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure. PhantomRaven is an NPM supply chain attack targeting DeFi, Cloud, and AI developers.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure (domains and IP addresses). This rule identifies communication with specific malicious domains and IP addresses associated with the PhantomRaven campaign, indicating potential compromise or attempted communication with adversary infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to known PhantomRaven Wave 5 command-and-control infrastructure (domains and IP). This rule specifically looks for connections to 'pack.nppacks.com', 'hblnew.ecompk.com', or the IP address '54.160.138.70'.
This rule detects various activities associated with CloudZ and Pheno malware, including persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks, execution of .NET loaders (regasm.exe), payload downloads using common utilities (curl, powershell, bitsadmin) from known staging patterns, reconnaissance artifacts, and network connections to known CloudZ infrastructure.
Detects process executions where the command line contains an HTTP/HTTPS URL with an explicit IPv4 address instead of a domain name. This technique is often used by malware and downloaders to fetch payloads or communicate with C2 servers while bypassing DNS.
Detects PowerShell processes executing commands that include common download cradle patterns (nop, w hidden, bypass) and attempt to retrieve content over HTTP/HTTPS. This often indicates an attempt to download and execute malicious scripts or payloads from a remote source.
Detects PowerShell processes executing commands that include base64 decoding (FromBase64String), invoking expressions (IEX), creating web client objects (New-Object Net.WebClient), and making HTTP/HTTPS requests. This combination is often indicative of malicious PowerShell activity, such as downloading and executing payloads from remote servers, potentially obfuscated.
Detects DNS resolution requests for the known Nexcorium C2 domain. The Nexcorium Mirai variant relies on this command-and-control server to receive attack parameters for large-scale DDoS campaigns.
Detects DNS resolution requests for the known Nexcorium C2 domain. The Nexcorium Mirai variant relies on this command-and-control server to receive attack parameters for large-scale DDoS campaigns.
Detects a specific combination of HTTP GET, POST, and PUT requests to the GitHub API (api.github.com) within a short timeframe. This sequence matches the behavior of the AdaptixC2 custom listener used by Tropic Trooper, which uses GitHub issues for beaconing/task polling and the contents API for data exfiltration. The detection has been refined to look for specific AdaptixC2 operational keywords ('beat', 'upload', 'download') to reduce noise.
Identifies active command and control or exfiltration connections associated with the recent AMOS Stealer campaign delivered via AI agents by matching known C2 infrastructure IP addresses.
Detects PowerShell processes executing web requests (Invoke-WebRequest, iwr, curl) followed by immediate code execution (iex, Invoke-Expression). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to download and execute malicious scripts or payloads directly in memory, bypassing disk-based detection.
Page 158 of 190