Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects TLS traffic featuring certificates where both the subject and issuer common name (CN) are set to 'SLIVER', which is the default configuration for the Sliver C2 framework's self-signed certificates.
Detects anomalous AI-assisted activity where multiple processes (specifically AI developer tools) appear to be chaining operations by writing to and reading from shared local directories (e.g., 'handoff', 'artifacts') followed by network requests to known AI service APIs. This pattern may indicate automated task chaining or unauthorized exfiltration of context/code to AI platforms.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed at known actor-controlled domains and subdomains associated with ScreenConnect remote management software usage in malicious RMM chains.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP POST requests to the '/api/t' URI path occurring on non-standard ports. The detection utilizes a threshold-based trigger to identify potential C2 communication heartbeats.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency outbound network connections to port 443 initiated by the binary 'rnpkeys.exe'. This behavior is characteristic of the Sauron Loader, which uses this masqueraded process to exfiltrate collected data, such as screenshots, via an encrypted C2 channel.
This rule detects network activity involving specific domain names (e.g., velvet-otter-glagceis.life) or HTTP request patterns associated with malicious JavaScript or trackers, which may indicate C2 communication or malicious script loading.
Detects AI agent tooling (e.g., Copilot, Cursor, Ollama) that makes outbound network calls to known AI model providers followed by the execution of suspicious shell commands within a short duration. The rule flags high-severity activities such as download-cradles, credential reconnaissance, LOLBin usage, and persistence mechanisms. Informational alerts are generated for standard CLI activity within the same timeframe.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources (File Events, Certificate Info, Network Events, and DNS Events) to detect known malicious indicators, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and URLs associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the Lumma Stealer 'ClickFix' phishing campaign. It identifies outbound requests to suspicious domains ending in .cyou utilizing specific user agents (WinHttp or Microsoft BITS), which are characteristic of malicious PowerShell scripts attempting to retrieve secondary payloads.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching file hashes against a known list of malicious indicators and monitoring for suspicious network connections. The network monitoring includes connections to hardcoded malicious IP addresses, specific C2 URLs, and DNS queries for known fallback domains used in malicious infrastructure when the initiating process is not a recognized web browser or wallet application.
Detects the installation of a potential remote monitoring and management (RMM) agent via common tools like msiexec, nssm, or sc.exe, followed by consistent HTTPS beaconing to domains hosted on Azurewebsites.net. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote access tools used for command and control.
This rule detects network connections originating from hosts to specific remote domains ('codeonicinc.com', 'setupsoftwarecenter.com') which are associated with OpenSUpdater command and control (C2) activity. It leverages Microsoft Defender DeviceNetworkEvents to identify endpoints communicating with these known malicious infrastructure components.
This rule detects outbound network connections originating from managed devices where the remote URL or domain matches known underground LLM-based services, such as WormGPT, FraudGPT, or EvilGPT, which are often used by threat actors for malicious activities like generating phishing content or malware.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a specific remote IP address (134.122.155.135) over port 443. This is characteristic of communication with a known or suspicious Command and Control (C2) server.
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