Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the VelvetCake malware installation and operational pattern, which utilizes a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' to execute PowerShell scripts ('update1.ps1' or 'update2.ps1'). These scripts periodically retrieve modules or payloads from external infrastructure, specifically hardcoded C2 IPs or a dedicated GitHub repository.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for any outbound network connections to a specific list of known malicious domains. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) communication by matching remote URLs against a hardcoded set of domains associated with known threats.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule detects the suspicious combination of PowerShell scripts executing download commands (Invoke-WebRequest, etc.) while initiated by scripting hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe), followed by activity associated with remote support tools (LogMeIn, ConnectWise, etc.). It also identifies network connections associated with these remote management platforms, suggesting potential unauthorized remote access or tool staging.
This rule monitors for execution of suspicious files or processes and network communication associated with known malicious indicators (hashes, domains, and IP addresses) typically used by specific threat actors for command and control (C2) and payload delivery.
Detects high-volume network activity from a single device/process to public IP addresses over common ports (80, 443) or UDP protocol. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control communication, automated data exfiltration, or a scanning attempt.
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
Detects outbound network traffic exhibiting the default self-signed TLS certificate subject and issuer fields 'O=Cobalt Strike' combined with the known default JA3 fingerprint '72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea' associated with Cobalt Strike C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control beaconing. The rule identifies communication to an external network using a specific URI pattern (4-16 alphanumeric characters), a 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' header, and a legacy Internet Explorer 7.0 User-Agent, while explicitly excluding common non-binary or HTML response formats in the request body.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Qakbot (QBot) malware command-and-control (C2) communication. This rule monitors for POST requests to .php files featuring a specific hardcoded User-Agent (IE 7.0 on Windows NT 5.1), a 'Cookie' header, 'application/octet-stream' content type, and a request body length of at least 201 characters.
Detects suspicious network connectivity where a newly executed process (that is not a browser or Slack) immediately establishes an outbound HTTPS connection to the Slack API. This behavior is indicative of potential malware implants or malicious scripts attempting to perform system reconnaissance and check-in to an attacker-controlled Slack workspace.
This rule detects network activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting outbound TCP connections or DNS resolutions involving known C2 domains by the rundll32.exe process. This activity is indicative of the malware's post-injection C2 registration and beaconing.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects host-based reconnaissance activity involving system, network, and security software enumeration using standard administrative tools (e.g., PowerShell, WMI, netsh) that is followed by an outbound network connection to a known or suspicious implant check-in endpoint within a 30-minute window.
Detects the presence of the 'SOUL.md' configuration file associated with the Hermes Agent AI framework. This file contains a specific 'GH0ST' persona prompt designed to bypass ethical restrictions (jailbreak) and configure the agent for automated post-exploitation tasks, such as loot collection and Telegram-based command and control.
Detects the CLOSEDQUORUM implant communicating with multiple LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, or Gemini) for quorum-based decision making, followed by the same process spawning or injecting into a legitimate Windows system process (e.g., svchost, explorer) to conduct post-exploitation activities.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware agent, including C2 tasking, Go agent 'frpc' tunnel configuration retrieval, tunnel deployment status reporting, and internal loopback C2 server communication.
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