Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects repeated, small outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests to an external destination, a behavior characteristic of scripted command-and-control (C2) beaconing where a client periodically polls a server for instructions.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects instances where a non-browser process initiates connections to commercial LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral) followed by a connection to Discord CDN/Webhook endpoints within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a process acting as an autonomous C2 agent that exfiltrates data after receiving instructions or processing information via an LLM.
Detects a non-browser process initiating network connections to four distinct commercial LLM API providers (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Google Gemini) within a 5-minute interval. This behavior is indicative of a C2 pattern where an adversary uses multiple LLM backends to perform plurality-vote or redundant queries, bypassing typical browser-based AI aggregation services.
Detects the creation or connection of named pipes that match known default and common malleable C2 profile patterns used by the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework. These named pipes are frequently utilized by Cobalt Strike beacons for inter-process communication, SMB/TCP beacon functionality, and staging during post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike SMB beacon activity by identifying the creation of suspicious named pipes (commonly associated with Cobalt Strike) and correlating them with low-jitter, uniform outbound network communication patterns typical of command and control (C2) beaconing behavior.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to a known list of malicious domains associated with phishing campaigns that deploy remote access tools (such as ScreenConnect or MSP360). These campaigns typically involve users interacting with malicious links to trigger downloads or remote management sessions.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to a known list of malicious domains associated with phishing campaigns that deploy remote access tools (such as ScreenConnect or MSP360). These campaigns typically involve users interacting with malicious links to trigger downloads or remote management sessions.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects network connections, process command line arguments, and DNS queries associated with identified Galago or Panzer ransomware C2, leak site, or contact infrastructure (Tox IDs/Tor .onion addresses).
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the Exvicy malware family. This includes heartbeat polling, victim fingerprinting registration, and CAPTCHA handling over HTTP GET and POST requests to the '/api.php' endpoint.
This rule monitors for the execution of an executable file (.exe) from a user's 'Downloads' directory followed shortly (within 5 minutes) by a network connection to port 4321, which is characteristic of the Bear C2 HTTPS-AES beacon pattern. This behavior is indicative of a potential secondary stage malware execution or C2 check-in after an initial user-driven download.
Detects network communication associated with the Bear C2 framework by identifying specific beacon URI patterns (/beacon?id=<uuid>) and connections to known non-standard listener ports (4321, 8080). The rule also monitors for process command lines containing specific hardcoded identifiers associated with this C2 implant.
This rule monitors for the execution of an executable file (.exe) from a user's 'Downloads' directory followed shortly (within 5 minutes) by a network connection to port 4321, which is characteristic of the Bear C2 HTTPS-AES beacon pattern. This behavior is indicative of a potential secondary stage malware execution or C2 check-in after an initial user-driven download.
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
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