Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the PhantomSub campaign, which abuse WhatsApp spam channels. It also identifies network connections to known remote C2 channel-list URLs or domains used by these packages to automate channel joining.
Detects DNS queries for the domain 'phf-ubp.com', which is associated with fraudulent HTS infrastructure. This rule monitors network traffic for indicators of communication with known malicious infrastructure.
Detects anomalous outbound HTTP POST requests containing sensitive file extensions or keywords (e.g., .docx, password, credentials) triggered by Python-based clients, followed by a potential exfiltration beacon response containing JSON file path data.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with Cicada3301 ransomware affiliate check-in behavior. The rule monitors for a specific 'X-Session-Id' HTTP header and a corresponding 'affiliate_id' parameter within the request body, which are indicative of malicious C2 communication.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
This rule identifies suspicious command and control (C2) activity by monitoring network connections to specific known malicious domains, detection of specific authentication tokens in process command lines, and the use of spoofed User-Agent strings associated with predefined C2 URI paths.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects the presence of an injected script tag containing 'ganalytics-tracker-js' in HTTP server responses, a pattern commonly associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands.
Detects network connections over port 443 initiated by a process named 'rnpkeys.exe' running from a suspicious staging directory ('\ProgramData\keyroll\'). This behavior is characteristic of side-loaded payloads establishing command-and-control communication for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests directed at the '/api/credentials' URI, a pattern associated with AMOS Stealer credential exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple requests occur from a single source within a short timeframe.
This rule detects network activity associated with the Sauron Loader malware. It monitors for TLS connections to known hardcoded C2 domains and identifies HTTP requests following a specific pattern of randomized command and control (C2) paths combined with suspicious User-Agent headers (Windows NT with Edge/Edg).
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity related to the AMOS (Atomic macOS) information stealer. It identifies a specific sequence of network requests where an initial registration beacon (POST /api/t) is followed by a shell agent request (GET /api/shell/agent) within 120 seconds, originating from the same destination IP and port.
This rule monitors for network connections and process activities associated with known malicious indicators, including file hashes, C2 IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs. It maps these activities to identify potential command and control communication or other malicious network activity occurring on endpoints.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects outbound network connections from devices to specific suspicious domains identified in the detection logic. This rule monitors for connections to 'ns2.asiainfo.it.com' and 'www.wordcheck.info', which may be indicative of malware communication, command and control, or malicious web activity.
This rule detects outbound HTTP GET requests initiated by a process using a 'WebClient' user-agent to retrieve a file named 'shell.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries downloading second-stage PowerShell payloads to a compromised host.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
Detects suspicious HTTP POST requests to a URI path '/collect' containing specific telemetry parameters ('visitorId', 'timeOnPage', 'stage') characteristic of the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign. This behavior is used by threat actors to simulate fake bot-protection challenges to trick users into executing malicious code.
Detects the execution of rnpkeys.exe from a specific path, followed by the loading of expected DLLs (rnp.dll or tdwp.dll) from the same directory, and a subsequent network connection on port 443. This behavior pattern is consistent with DLL side-loading used to establish a network-based command and control channel.
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