Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity initiated by Node.js processes towards specific Infura and Alchemy RPC endpoints for the Sepolia testnet, including specific JSON-RPC queries containing potential malicious contract addresses. This pattern is indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Web3 infrastructure.
Hunts network, HTTP, and email-URL telemetry for known ARToken infrastructure (operator backend IPs and phishing/panel domains). Bounded to a 30-day lookback and tiers matches by confidence: domain hits are high-confidence (attacker-registered infrastructure), while IP hits are medium-confidence since the IPs sit on shared DigitalOcean hosting that can be reassigned to unrelated tenants once ARToken's infrastructure is taken down. Empty/unparsed indicator fields are excluded to avoid spurious matches in the HTTP event parsing branch. No known file hashes are associated with this intel.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known malicious file hashes (MD5) across file and process events, and correlating them with known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure communication patterns, including specific IP addresses and URI paths.
This rule detects potential credential theft by monitoring for file access (creation, modification, or renaming) to common web browser sensitive files (Login Data or Cookies) followed by an outbound network connection from the same process within a 10-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to exfiltrate browser-stored credentials or session cookies.
Detects host-based activity or network communication associated with the SloppyRAT remote access trojan. The rule monitors for specific malicious file hashes and connection attempts to known C2 IP addresses and domains.
Detects anomalous AI orchestration or API gateway activity that suggests potential command and control (C2) communication. The rule monitors for unauthorized external endpoints, high-frequency low-payload beaconing patterns, and unauthorized cross-tenant agent-to-agent calls.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to known SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) infrastructure IPs. The detection filters for successful connections on common ports (80, 443) that meet a volume threshold, indicating potential ongoing beaconing or communication with malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects instances where a process associated with a known StealC command-and-control (C2) IP address subsequently spawns a hidden cmd.exe instance. It correlates network connections to known malicious infrastructure with the creation of hidden command shells within the same device session, specifically looking for common parent processes like web browsers or system utilities.
This rule monitors for potential MeshAgent activity associated with the Settra threat actor. It identifies processes that are likely renamed instances of MeshAgent (via metadata inspection), processes attempting to communicate with known C2 IP addresses, and direct network connections to these C2 IP addresses.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects indicators associated with the exploitation of CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow. The rule identifies anomalous web requests targeting the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint, subsequent suspicious process creation (base64 encoded payloads in Python/shell), and network communication with identified command and control (C2) or data exfiltration IP addresses. It also includes alerts for observed contact with known extortion email addresses.
Detects potential C2 activity associated with MQTTDoor or MatrixDoor malware by monitoring suspicious network traffic patterns. This includes unauthorized processes connecting to MQTT brokers (hivemq.com), non-chat applications interacting with a Matrix homeserver, and geo-location lookups (ip-api.com) occurring shortly after process execution.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects outbound network connections from devices to specific suspicious domains identified in the detection logic. This rule monitors for connections to 'ns2.asiainfo.it.com' and 'www.wordcheck.info', which may be indicative of malware communication, command and control, or malicious web activity.
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