Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific 'Accept' header configuration commonly associated with Vidar Stealer command and control (C2) communication. This signature relies on the consistency of HTTP header patterns often observed in Vidar infections.
Detects network activity associated with shellcode staging, specifically requests to the domain 'deadhub.org' or its specific IP address using hardcoded paths that mimic static UI assets. This activity is indicative of a loader fetching malicious fragments for in-memory execution.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious processes (like Python scripts or random executables) accessing Telegram Desktop's local 'tdata' directory, which contains user session information, and simultaneously exhibiting network activity directed towards Telegram API domains. This behavior is highly indicative of infostealer activity, where a malicious process attempts to harvest local Telegram session data for exfiltration.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
This rule monitors for network connections and process activities associated with known malicious indicators, including file hashes, C2 IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs. It maps these activities to identify potential command and control communication or other malicious network activity occurring on endpoints.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
Detection of network traffic associated with VelvetCake (Konni) malware, identifying communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, domain lookups, and exfiltration attempts via HTTP/TLS and raw TCP protocols.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects outbound network connections from internal devices to a set of known malicious IP addresses (217.156.122.129, 37.221.66.43) across commonly abused command-and-control ports (8080, 3480, 9998, 9999, 4444).
Detects outbound network connections from internal devices to a set of known malicious IP addresses (217.156.122.129, 37.221.66.43) across commonly abused command-and-control ports (8080, 3480, 9998, 9999, 4444).
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
This rule detects network activity associated with known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. It monitors for connections to specific malicious domains, IP addresses, or URI paths combined with unique HTTP headers or request body markers indicative of C2 beacons or data exfiltration.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for any outbound network connections to a specific list of known malicious domains. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) communication by matching remote URLs against a hardcoded set of domains associated with known threats.
This rule monitors for user interactions with specific domains and URLs known to be associated with suspicious or malicious activity. It aggregates data from multiple sources, including email clicks (UrlClickEvents), device network activity (DeviceNetworkEvents), device browser events (DeviceEvents), and DNS queries (DnsEvents), to identify potential exposure to these indicators of compromise.
Detects HTTP connections between internal hosts and suspected C2 infrastructure associated with the Operation SilkParasite campaign. The rule specifically monitors for connections to known malicious IPs and identifies the retrieval of a cloned RTX Corporation homepage content, which acts as a decoy for the SpiceRAT malware.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects network communication to identified SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) infrastructure over TCP port 443. This includes monitoring for standard TCP connections and TLS sessions to known malicious IP addresses.
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