Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign. This includes detection of TLS traffic using self-signed LokiDev certificates (CN=localhost, O=LokiDev), direct connections to known malicious C2 IP addresses, and DNS queries for the domain normativ.dushanbeidc.org, which is linked to the LokiDev infrastructure.
Detects potential cross-family Command and Control (C2) activity by correlating multiple network infrastructure indicators associated with the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule identifies source hosts that interact with at least two distinct indicator sets (specific malicious domains, shared TLS certificates, or cloned homepage content hashes) within a one-hour timeframe.
Detects network communication to known SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and DNS queries for known SpiceRAT-related domains. The rule identifies potential compromise by flagging outbound traffic or DNS resolutions associated with SpiceRAT infrastructure.
Detects network traffic attempting to impersonate the Uzbekistan railway authority via suspicious TLS certificates. The rules identify specific SNI domains, certificate subjects, and issuers associated with the 'SilkParasite' campaign, which uses Chinese state-affiliated certificate authorities to facilitate C2 communications.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API that indicate the exfiltration of sensitive camera credentials or snapshots. The rules identify specific API endpoints such as '/sendPhoto' and the presence of Markdown-formatted text containing 'Login:', 'Password:', and 'Model:' fields within the request body.
Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign, specifically targeting TLS connections that use spoofed certificates impersonating azure.uzrailwaystax.com or communication with known SpiceRAT command-and-control server IP addresses.
Detects network communications between internal hosts and known malicious infrastructure associated with SpiceRAT, including TLS-based command channels and HTTP requests for decoy pages.
This rule monitors network HTTP traffic containing specific strings related to gym-membership APIs and client IDs, alongside process or file activity referencing 'getFitnessProfile'. This combination is a behavioral fingerprint associated with a specific Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attempting to exfiltrate or interact with fitness profile data.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution that interacts with the GitHub API, specifically targeting the upload of files or JSON data to repository endpoints. The logic looks for commands related to file system access, inclusion of 'api.github.com', and references to 'SmartUploader' or 'uploaded_files.json'. It further filters for activity occurring within standard user directories and enforces a check to ensure the GitHub repository name matches the local hostname, which is a common indicator of automated exfiltration scripts.
Detects individual file access events performed by non-browser python processes. This rule is designed as a proxy to identify automated file collection activities, such as those performed by 'python-httpx', that may be indicative of low-volume data exfiltration when aggregated over time.
This rule detects network activity associated with the SilverFox malware, specifically targeting communication patterns between the compromised host and identified relay infrastructure. The detection focuses on unique URL query patterns for relay discovery and dispatcher requests, as well as the identification of staging/download links within server responses.
Detects network activity associated with the Rapuncel malware, including raw TCP exfiltration of files via POST requests to /upload, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure, and repeated exfiltration retry patterns.
This rule detects repeated HTTP POST requests to a Polygon blockchain endpoint ('eth_call') containing specific contract address and method identifiers. This behavior is indicative of 'EtherHiding', a technique where attackers use blockchain smart contracts to host malicious C2 configurations or update C2 infrastructure, allowing for stealthy dynamic command and control rotation.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
Detects network communication to domains and specific file paths associated with the MacSync macOS stealer, which is used for malware dropper delivery and command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators such as specific malicious URLs, iCloud path abuse, and C2 infrastructure interaction.
Detects network communication to domains and specific file paths associated with the MacSync macOS stealer, which is used for malware dropper delivery and command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators such as specific malicious URLs, iCloud path abuse, and C2 infrastructure interaction.
Detects network activity associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, including QUIC C2 traffic using a self-signed 'RAT System' certificate, direct connections to a known C2 IP address (104.64.211.22), and DNS queries for the hardcoded C2 domain 'register.mediumser.com'.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects outbound network connections from internal devices to public IP addresses over standard MQTT (1883) or MQTT over TLS (8883) ports. MQTT is frequently used for IoT communication but can be abused for command and control (C2) or unauthorized data exfiltration.
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