Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects browser activity where a user agent navigates to common webmail services (Gmail, Outlook) followed quickly by network traffic to potentially malicious external infrastructure or non-standard endpoints, suggesting unauthorized email content exfiltration.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download files from Vultr Object Storage, specifically targeting patterns associated with the HEAVYGRAM malware distribution. The rule monitors for PowerShell cradles (WebClient, DownloadFile), archive extraction commands, or the execution of a specific payload name (RuntimeSSH.exe) often linked to the Handala Hack threat activity.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized network communication with AI platforms (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini) or Telegram from hosts executing suspicious processes or tools, such as 'frpc' (Fast Reverse Proxy), 'liblocal-service.so', or processes interacting with Android Debug Bridge (adb) utilities. This behavior often suggests the use of automated tools, remote tunneling, or interaction with AI models for post-exploitation tasks, such as code generation for malicious scripts or C2 activity.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the specific '/api/node/register' URI, which is associated with the RatHat RAT command and control (C2) node registration behavior.
Detects network communication to Telegram API (api.telegram.org) indicative of HEAVYGRAM malware command and control (C2) beaconing. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the /sendMessage endpoint containing a chat ID and the hardcoded 'is online' message string, which is characteristic of this implant's check-in behavior.
HBO Max ClickFix attacks IOC Hunt
Cortex XDR
Detects network activity (DNS queries or direct IP communication) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks targeting users under the guise of an HBO Max update or repair utility. The rule includes indicators for known malicious domains and IP addresses while incorporating filters to minimize false positives from security scanners, threat intel feeds, and automated crawlers by analyzing User-Agent strings and network source addresses.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests to a specific C2 domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online' masquerading as CSS file fetches. The request pattern uses a specific path '/google_api/' followed by predefined alphanumeric filenames, consistent with the KREMLIN malware browser extension's C2 polling mechanism.
Detects outbound network communication from common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) to a specific malicious domain and path associated with suspected Kremlin-linked screenshot exfiltration activities.
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at 'relay.php' containing a specific 'CrpxBoundary' in the request body and an 'Authorization' header with the value 'Bearer crpx0_c2_2026'. This pattern is indicative of the CRPx0 malware exfiltrating data in chunks over an established C2 channel.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects network activity associated with the SilverFox malware, specifically targeting the discovery of relay endpoints via specific URI patterns containing cache-busting timestamps, DNS lookups for identified relay domains (noah-ssh.com.cn) and Cloudflare Workers subdomains, and suspicious HTTP response characteristics such as specific cache headers paired with wildcard CORS headers.
Detects network activity associated with the 'SilverFox' malware family's command-and-control relay dispatcher. The rules identify specific HTTP requests to 'api.php', responses containing 'download_link', and the serving of legitimate WeChat installer payloads as a fallback mechanism for evasion, including the use of cache-busting parameters.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
Detects the MovieReaper payload behavior where a specific file manager process masquerading as a legitimate system utility (msedge.exe) performs mass file enumeration or access followed by suspicious outbound network connections, indicative of data staging and exfiltration.
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