Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
This rule monitors network connections, file events, and process execution command lines for references to a list of known malicious URLs, including indicators associated with ClearFake, IClickFix, AMOS, Remus, and Mozi botnet payloads.
This rule detects internal network activity (DNS queries, network connections, and security logs) communicating with domains associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. These domains are typically used to host credential harvesting pages or phishing infrastructure.
Detects network activity and HTTP request headers associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. The rule identifies specific URI patterns, custom site keys, malicious User-Agent strings, and session cookie artifacts indicative of interaction with a phishing server.
Detects HTTP POST exfiltration patterns characteristic of the RevStealer malware. The rule identifies suspicious POST requests to a /cdn/ URI path with specific internal file naming, utilizing a spoofed Chrome 147 User-Agent and specific header indicators (_fbp, _sid).
This rule detects HTTP GET requests containing specific URI parameters (OKey, Who, Areyou=cake) indicative of communication patterns associated with the Konni and VelvetCake malware families during exfiltration or command-and-control operations.
Detects HTTP POST requests to gapidriver.com/api/rest.php containing stager-specific status messages like 'build started', 'launch error', or 'all builds loaded', indicating NeedleStealer malware command-and-control activity.
Detects HTTP traffic from internal hosts to the 'gapidriver.com' domain, specifically identifying the GapiUpdate stager behavior. The rule looks for authenticated GET requests to '/api/get.php' using a specific Bearer token and User-Agent, as well as status reporting to '/api/rest.php'.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
Bigbear V2 Ioc Hunt
Sigma
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule monitors for DNS queries and network connections to known infrastructure domains associated with the threat group UTA0565. It acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep to identify internal systems attempting to communicate with malicious command-and-control (C2) servers identified by typosquatting and registration-pattern analysis.
Detects initial beaconing registration behavior associated with the CLEANGULP malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP POST requests to the '/beacon/pre-register' URI path. The rule monitors network device events and can identify this activity even if the adversary switches C2 infrastructure, provided the specific beaconing URI remains constant.
Detects a two-stage pattern indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication. The rule identifies an initial request to a 'relays.json' endpoint (relay discovery) followed by a request to an 'api.php' endpoint (dispatcher decision) within a 5-second window, both using a 13-digit timestamp query string for cache-busting. It also captures single-stage 'api.php' requests as lower confidence alerts.
Detects unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive information, such as camera credentials or location data, directed to the Telegram Bot API as part of the 'Operation CameraSwarm' campaign.
Detects unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive information, such as camera credentials or location data, directed to the Telegram Bot API as part of the 'Operation CameraSwarm' campaign.
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