Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the domain 'mnl.ac' and its associated infrastructure (IPs 149.255.35.135 and 45.74.7.27). The rules monitor for DNS queries, HTTP requests to fetch configuration files (configuration.ps1), and general outbound TCP connections that characterize the staging phase of the ClickFix PowerShell execution chain.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects network traffic patterns associated with the Kimsuky threat group utilizing raw.githubusercontent.com as a dead-drop resolver. The rule specifically identifies the retrieval of configuration files (.ini) and victim-specific data files (.dat) containing MachineGuid identifiers, which are characteristic of Kimsuky's command and control (C2) operations.
This rule monitors for outbound network connections to domains and IP addresses associated with known phishing, loader, and C2 infrastructure, including specific ClickFix patterns.
Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
Detects network connections to command-and-control infrastructure associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer malicious browser extension. The rule triggers on connections to known malicious domains or IPs, as well as specific API endpoints on ambiguous domains that are used for exfiltrating Twitch OAuth tokens.
Detects network beaconing and communications associated with the NetSupport Manager remote access tool. The rules monitor for outbound connections to a known actor-controlled IP/domain and identify unauthorized client responses containing a specific license serial number.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
This rule detects network traffic containing specific API paths or hardcoded tokens known to be associated with suspicious or malicious activity, potentially indicating command-and-control (C2) communication or unauthorized interaction with a web service.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
Detects indicators of compromise related to the TraderTraitor (KelpDAO) threat actor, including specific file hashes, malicious process paths, C2 network infrastructure (IPs and domains), and malicious TLS certificates. The rule uses filename-path matching to reduce noise from legitimate macOS binaries.
This rule detects outbound network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with adversary command and control infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors connections over common ports, potentially indicating established communication with malicious servers.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the RatHat Android malware. Specifically, it monitors for HTTP requests targeting the '/api/sapp' or '/api/bapp' URIs, which are used by this malware for C2 evasion or to retrieve its block list.
Page 65 of 190