Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the HEAVYGRAM malware beaconing to Telegram's API. It identifies HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing specific URI strings and parameters, which suggests the bot is performing check-in activities or sending status updates via a Telegram bot channel.
Detects network activity associated with the HEAVYGRAM PowerShell implant, specifically identifying outbound traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). The rule looks for established connections and HTTP requests containing Telegram bot-specific URI patterns ('/bot', '/getUpdates') coupled with a 'WindowsPowerShell' user agent, indicating an automated beaconing mechanism used for command and control.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity by monitoring for a specific executable file name ('msedge.exe') located in a non-standard path ('ProgramData'), as well as network connections to a known malicious IP address ('193.23.118.155') and DNS requests for a domain associated with suspicious activity ('deadhub.org').
This rule detects the execution of a file with a suspicious media-themed filename (e.g., related to 1080p, BluRay, etc.) from a known BitTorrent client process, followed by an immediate network connection to a known malicious C2 IP address or domain within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a user downloading and executing a malicious file disguised as pirated media.
This rule detects the execution of a specific known malicious file (identified by MD5 hash A0B13781EDD7CFDAB13D79AFFF3C83C1) followed by an outbound network connection to a suspicious IP address (193.23.118.155) or domain (deadhub.org) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a malicious loader establishing a command and control (C2) channel.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the MovieReaper loader, specifically targeting shellcode fragment fetches from the deadhub.org domain, a specific fallback IP address, or requests to identifiable decoy asset paths used by the malware for staging or C2 communication.
Detects network beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the HEAVYGRAM backdoor, which utilizes the Telegram Bot API for remote interaction. This rule monitors for encrypted SNI traffic directed at api.telegram.org, as well as specific HTTP polling and command execution patterns (e.g., /getUpdates, /bot<token>/) indicating automated interaction with a Telegram bot controlled by an adversary.
Detects the GHAPPIER loader pattern: a top-level require('https').get() call to the primevector-app924560.vercel.app C2 that evals the response, disguised inside a large benign-looking JavaScript benchmark file
Detects the GHAPPIER loader pattern: a top-level require('https').get() call to the primevector-app924560.vercel.app C2 that evals the response, disguised inside a large benign-looking JavaScript benchmark file
Detects the GHAPPIER loader pattern: a top-level require('https').get() call to the primevector-app924560.vercel.app C2 that evals the response, disguised inside a large benign-looking JavaScript benchmark file
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
Detects network traffic on non-standard ports (excluding port 443) where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains 'dl.google.com'. This pattern is frequently observed as a method for C2 tunneling tools like Xray-core to disguise malicious command and control traffic by masquerading as legitimate Google service traffic.
Detects network traffic attempting to use 'dl.google.com' as the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) header, which is a common indicator of Xray-core C2 tunneling or obfuscation. This rule identifies traffic attempting to masquerade as legitimate Google traffic and should be correlated with endpoint process information to confirm the initiating process is not a browser or authorized Google-related application.
Detects network requests to the Gitea Prometheus metrics API that contain 'k=' and 'x=' query parameters, a pattern indicative of a C2 command channel disguised as legitimate telemetry traffic.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Page 66 of 190