Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,989 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,774
868
397
195
188
Contributors
1,070
924
756
221
96
Categories
2,448
1,307
1,164
785
713
Platforms
2,415
1,310
658
528
133
Products / Services
1,307
886
808
561
337
MITRE Techniques
18,128
15,651
12,599
8,410
6,235
3,989
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
564
275
11
8
6
IDS Protocols
537
174
64
64
12
This rule detects cloud file access (Download, Accessed, or Sync) originating from a Python-based user-agent (python-httpx) associated with specific Microsoft 365 applications, flagged by either an uncommon ISP or an uncommon user-agent for that specific user. This behavior is indicative of potential automated data collection or exfiltration attempts using programmatic access against cloud storage services.
Detects high-volume outbound network traffic (exceeding 100MB) generated by processes identifying as 'python-httpx' to non-internal IP addresses. This activity is often associated with automated data exfiltration using Python-based tools.
Detects network activity related to the SilverFox modular malware framework, including relay/dispatcher discovery, contact with known C2 infrastructure (noah-ssh.com.cn and Cloudflare Workers), and specific HTTP response patterns associated with its relay discovery process.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business originating from a 'python-httpx' user agent. This pattern often indicates automated data collection or exfiltration attempts using programmatic tools.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
Detects a process that has established a connection to the Telegram Bot API subsequently performing a large volume of file deletions across multiple folders within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a remote-controlled destructive attack, such as the deployment of a wiper malware (e.g., HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK) triggered via Telegram C2 commands.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Cortex XDR)
Cortex XDR
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Gravwell)
Gravwell
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests to a specific C2 domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online' masquerading as CSS file fetches. The request pattern uses a specific path '/google_api/' followed by predefined alphanumeric filenames, consistent with the KREMLIN malware browser extension's C2 polling mechanism.
This rule detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the KREMLIN browser extension. The extension exfiltrates browser data (cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage) by masquerading data transfer within requests to .css files hosted on the attacker-controlled domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online'.
This rule detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the KREMLIN browser extension. The extension exfiltrates browser data (cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage) by masquerading data transfer within requests to .css files hosted on the attacker-controlled domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online'.
This rule detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the KREMLIN browser extension. The extension exfiltrates browser data (cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage) by masquerading data transfer within requests to .css files hosted on the attacker-controlled domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online'.
This rule detects network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the KREMLIN browser extension. The extension exfiltrates browser data (cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage) by masquerading data transfer within requests to .css files hosted on the attacker-controlled domain 'luizestrelhashapr.online'.
This rule monitors network traffic for requests directed at a specific domain ('luizestrelhashapr.online') and path ('/google_api/b83fa72d.css'), which is identified in threat intelligence as an indicator of browser history exfiltration.
This rule monitors network traffic for requests directed at a specific domain ('luizestrelhashapr.online') and path ('/google_api/b83fa72d.css'), which is identified in threat intelligence as an indicator of browser history exfiltration.
This rule monitors network traffic for requests directed at a specific domain ('luizestrelhashapr.online') and path ('/google_api/b83fa72d.css'), which is identified in threat intelligence as an indicator of browser history exfiltration.
Detects outbound network communication from common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe) to a specific malicious domain and path associated with suspected Kremlin-linked screenshot exfiltration activities.
Page 67 of 190