Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects outbound network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with adversary command and control infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors connections over common ports, potentially indicating established communication with malicious servers.
This rule detects either the presence of known malicious image files (based on SHA256 hashes) on a device or network connection attempts to known malicious URLs hosting such files. This pattern is commonly associated with steganographic techniques used to hide malicious payloads within image files for C2 or delivery.
This rule detects network connections to a list of known lookalike domains or specific indicators (a payload GUID and a URI hash) associated with suspicious activity. It uses a time-based aggregation to identify hosts interacting with multiple suspicious domains or both specific payload indicators, suggesting potential C2 activity or a targeted phishing/malware delivery campaign.
This rule monitors network connections and HTTP requests for specific URL patterns that include encoded (base64) parameters and indicators often associated with command and control or data exfiltration. It detects endpoints accessing URLs containing a prefix sequence of 10 characters and specific endpoints like '/generate' or '/kremlin'.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by monitoring for a two-stage pattern: a SignalR negotiation POST request followed by a WebSocket upgrade request to a suspicious domain structure. The pattern specifically targets lookalike domains featuring a random subdomain of at least 12 alphanumeric characters, which is indicative of ORAX-style AiTM infrastructure.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by monitoring for a two-stage pattern: a SignalR negotiation POST request followed by a WebSocket upgrade request to a suspicious domain structure. The pattern specifically targets lookalike domains featuring a random subdomain of at least 12 alphanumeric characters, which is indicative of ORAX-style AiTM infrastructure.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by monitoring for a two-stage pattern: a SignalR negotiation POST request followed by a WebSocket upgrade request to a suspicious domain structure. The pattern specifically targets lookalike domains featuring a random subdomain of at least 12 alphanumeric characters, which is indicative of ORAX-style AiTM infrastructure.
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
Bigbear V2 Ioc Hunt
Sigma
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Cortex XDR)
Cortex XDR
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Cortex XDR)
Cortex XDR
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Gravwell)
Gravwell
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Gravwell)
Gravwell
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Gravwell)
Gravwell
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects periodic outbound network connections (beaconing) to rare remote destinations initiated by processes running from non-standard or user-writable locations. The rule calculates the interval coefficient of variation (CV) between successful connections to identify regular, consistent patterns indicative of command and control communication while excluding known legitimate update and service traffic.
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