Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connection attempts to specific external domains associated with suspicious JavaScript payloads. The rule filters for specific file paths (e.g., mpackage.js, bsc-loader.js) linked to known malicious or suspicious URL patterns on cdn.claritydelivr.com, rcrsinnovations.com, konverto.in, and cdn.api-middle-connect.com, which may indicate C2 beaconing or malware infection.
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
Detects HTTP responses containing JavaScript-based anti-bot challenge patterns commonly used by phishing kits to identify and block automated crawlers, security scanners, and headless browsers.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with C2 infrastructure challenges, specifically looking for anti-bot/anti-scanner responses containing specific JavaScript variables ('badAgents', 'js_enabled=1') and subsequent client-side validation requests containing a specific token structure and 'check=1' parameter.
This rule detects potential BabylonRAT C2 beaconing activity by monitoring for recurring outbound HTTP GET requests using a 'Firefox' User-Agent string on non-standard HTTP ports. The threshold mechanism specifically flags repeated connections within a short time frame, which is characteristic of malware beaconing behavior.
Detects repeated polling activity against a suspected device code endpoint, common in OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant phishing attacks where an adversary attempts to maintain session persistence or status checks for a stolen device code.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects HTTP beaconing activity associated with the Kimsuky threat group (Stella_Gary), specifically identifying requests to the /unicorn/ path. This pattern is characteristic of their C2 communication mechanism, which masquerades as legitimate browsing.
Detects established network connections to a known Kimsuky-associated infrastructure (107.172.249.140) on port 443. The rule filters out standard TLS handshakes by inspecting initial packet content, targeting non-standard or custom-protocol traffic, and limits alerts to once per hour per source host to reduce noise.
Detects established network connections to a known Kimsuky-associated infrastructure (107.172.249.140) on port 443. The rule filters out standard TLS handshakes by inspecting initial packet content, targeting non-standard or custom-protocol traffic, and limits alerts to once per hour per source host to reduce noise.
Detects established network connections to a known Kimsuky-associated infrastructure (107.172.249.140) on port 443. The rule filters out standard TLS handshakes by inspecting initial packet content, targeting non-standard or custom-protocol traffic, and limits alerts to once per hour per source host to reduce noise.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects HTTP GET requests associated with the Kimsuky threat actor, specifically targeting the retrieval of payloads like uni.txt or files matching the test.bef_fri pattern from the /unicorn/ directory.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characterized by rapid domain rotation, where multiple distinct domains resolve to a known set of IronToll C2 infrastructure IP addresses within a short timeframe (48 hours). Added an explicit 2-day lookback window — the original query had no time bound at all, so every scheduled run re-scanned the table's entire retention period and would keep re-surfacing the same historical match indefinitely instead of only genuinely recent activity.
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