Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

3,989 detections

Detects outbound web requests directed at public NPM mirrors and CDNs (unpkg, npmmirror, yarnpkg, jsdelivr) that contain strings matching known malicious package names associated with the 'Beamglea/ClickFix' campaign. This activity is typically indicative of a victim visiting a deceptive Cloudflare CAPTCHA phishing page designed to execute malicious scripts in the browser.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
001
Detects the download of ZIP files with filenames matching known phishing patterns associated with NFe (Nota Fiscal Eletrônica) campaigns, correlated with access to specific malicious or suspicious download URLs within a 15-minute window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting specific UK council ModernGov websites (e.g., Lambeth, Wandsworth, Southwark). It looks for outbound HTTP requests from non-browser clients (specifically identifying 'Ruby' in the User-Agent string) to these specific gov.uk domains, with a threshold to catch repeated attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting specific UK council ModernGov websites (e.g., Lambeth, Wandsworth, Southwark). It looks for outbound HTTP requests from non-browser clients (specifically identifying 'Ruby' in the User-Agent string) to these specific gov.uk domains, with a threshold to catch repeated attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects an HTTP POST request targeting the host 'tt.yeyoujs.com' at the URI path '/api/agent/enroll', containing a specific Python aiohttp User-Agent string. This pattern is characteristic of a C2 agent attempting to register or enroll with an external command-and-control server.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
004
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known MeshCentral Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. MeshCentral is legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software that is frequently abused by threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to victim environments. This rule monitors for established TCP connections on specific ports associated with MeshCentral C2 nodes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known MeshCentral Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. MeshCentral is legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software that is frequently abused by threat actors to maintain persistent remote access to victim environments. This rule monitors for established TCP connections on specific ports associated with MeshCentral C2 nodes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
Detects instances where internal devices access the 3BB sales portal (agent.3bb.co.th) while demonstrating signs of compromise. The rule correlates the portal access with recent network activity involving identified MeshCentral attacker infrastructure (ayuthayatech.com or 92.63.180.133) and further filters for behavioral anomalies such as off-hours access, the use of non-standard browser processes, or the use of unexpected service accounts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects instances where internal devices access the 3BB sales portal (agent.3bb.co.th) while demonstrating signs of compromise. The rule correlates the portal access with recent network activity involving identified MeshCentral attacker infrastructure (ayuthayatech.com or 92.63.180.133) and further filters for behavioral anomalies such as off-hours access, the use of non-standard browser processes, or the use of unexpected service accounts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects execution of the JITTERLY Linux backdoor masquerading as 'configd' (with its -nodel fallback flag) and/or beaconing to its hardcoded C2 domain (s2.981666.xyz:8082), matching Red Heron's observed tradecraft.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
This rule identifies potential command-and-control (C2) beaconing behavior by detecting repetitive, consistent connections (low jitter) to public IP addresses over common TLS ports (443, 8443, 4443, 9443) from processes that do not have a known history of connecting to those destinations. It establishes a baseline of historical connections to filter out legitimate traffic and uses a statistical analysis of connection intervals to highlight suspicious, non-human-like automated communication patterns.
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Shadows VMB@Vemorian_Mort
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying periodic outbound network connections from suspicious or non-browser processes. It analyzes the time deltas between successful network connections; if the standard deviation of these intervals is low (indicating consistent timing) and a sufficient number of connections occur, it flags the behavior as a potential C2 heartbeat.
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Shadows VMB@Vemorian_Mort
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
22028
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a host is communicating with the Telegram Bot API. The rule identifies high-frequency connections to api.telegram.org and inspects HTTP URIs for signs of Telegram Bot token usage combined with 'sendDocument' or 'sendPhoto' commands, which are common indicators of malicious exfiltration.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a host is communicating with the Telegram Bot API. The rule identifies high-frequency connections to api.telegram.org and inspects HTTP URIs for signs of Telegram Bot token usage combined with 'sendDocument' or 'sendPhoto' commands, which are common indicators of malicious exfiltration.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
This rule detects command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the 'soraki-proxy.workers.dev' domain, a Cloudflare Workers-hosted proxy service. Additionally, it identifies potential malicious mTLS implants by flagging non-standard TLS handshakes that use self-signed or auto-generated certificates missing standard organization (O) fields in the subject DN.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the legitimate wmpnetwk.exe process, commonly used as a target for ShadowPad process injection, initiating outbound network connections while simultaneously accessing Firefox browser profile data. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and command-and-control communication typical of post-compromise activity.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
102
This rule detects potential automated web scraping activity by identifying high-volume, repetitive network requests directed towards domains identified as government (.gov) or military (.mil). It correlates these network patterns with the execution of common browser automation frameworks (e.g., Puppeteer, Playwright) or headless browsers, indicating a likely coordinated scraping operation or bot activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
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