Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

3,989 detections

Detects repeated, non-interactive requests to the Google Sheets Visualization API (gviz/tq) originating from common web browsers. This pattern is indicative of a malicious browser extension attempting to reconstruct or reinject payloads when a user visits specific targeted websites.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects a multi-stage browser-based web skimming attack. The rule identifies a specific sequence of network activity: a device fetching an obfuscated loader script from 'paste.sh', followed by retrieving payload fragments from the 'Google Sheets Visualization API', and concluding with network interactions with crypto-transaction services 'SwapZone.io' or 'SimpleSwap.io', characteristic of a browser-based wallet-drainer campaign.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects a multi-stage browser-based web skimming attack. The rule identifies a specific sequence of network activity: a device fetching an obfuscated loader script from 'paste.sh', followed by retrieving payload fragments from the 'Google Sheets Visualization API', and concluding with network interactions with crypto-transaction services 'SwapZone.io' or 'SimpleSwap.io', characteristic of a browser-based wallet-drainer campaign.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
000
This rule detects potential web skimmer activity where a user's browser performs a network connection to known payload delivery hosts (e.g., paste.sh or Google Sheets API) followed by a clipboard modification event on the same device within a one-hour window. This behavior is consistent with malicious scripts attempting to replace copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with an attacker-controlled address.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects browser-based network requests to the Google Sheets Visualization API (gviz/tq) that appear to be used for fetching malicious JavaScript payloads from public Google Sheets. The rule specifically identifies instances where a process initiates these requests without any corresponding active browser session associated with standard Google Docs or Sheets editing activity.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Hunters
2 months ago
000
Detects a multi-stage browser-based web skimming attack. The rule identifies a specific sequence of network activity: a device fetching an obfuscated loader script from 'paste.sh', followed by retrieving payload fragments from the 'Google Sheets Visualization API', and concluding with network interactions with crypto-transaction services 'SwapZone.io' or 'SimpleSwap.io', characteristic of a browser-based wallet-drainer campaign.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects Adblock.dll used by Docro Hijacker to bypass Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity checks and register infected browser UUID via vendralo[.]info
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects network connections to known suspicious infrastructure, including specific domains associated with Session, catbox.moe, or targeted npm registry and GitHub API queries initiated by common command-line utilities. This behavior often suggests adversary communication, data staging, or potential tool/malware delivery.
avatar
Montaser Ismail@M0nt3x
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
507
Detects the use of VPN clients, tunneling tools (like Tor, ngrok, plink, and SSH port forwarding), and network proxy configurations on endpoints. The rule monitors for known VPN process execution, network connections to VPN provider domains, unauthorized tunnel protocol activity, and Windows registry-based proxy modifications.
avatar
Huse Yin@hsyn
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
13041
Detects HTTP 301 redirection responses from a hardcoded IP address to an external domain associated with ProRAM command-and-control infrastructure.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects outbound network traffic associated with StyleSmuggler C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies established TLS connections to a known malicious IP address (99.84.67.186) and monitors for WebSocket-over-TLS traffic using the suspicious SNI 'windwsecurity.run'.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects outbound web requests directed at public NPM mirrors and CDNs (unpkg, npmmirror, yarnpkg, jsdelivr) that contain strings matching known malicious package names associated with the 'Beamglea/ClickFix' campaign. This activity is typically indicative of a victim visiting a deceptive Cloudflare CAPTCHA phishing page designed to execute malicious scripts in the browser.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known phishing domains (typosquatted Microsoft login domains), DeadDrop Resolver domains, and suspicious HTML payloads served from common CDN/package hosting sites (e.g., unpkg.com, npmmirror.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, yarnpkg.com). These patterns are indicative of initial access attempts via phishing or the secondary stage of malware C2 communication.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
101
Detects coordinated behavioral signals associated with the CVE-2025-25249 campaign, which deploys the PivotC2 Node.js RAT on FortiGate devices. The rule correlates anomalous inbound CAPWAP (UDP/5246) traffic, Node.js process execution, suspicious JavaScript file writes, and unauthorized access to Fortinet configuration files, followed by long-lived outbound TLS beacons to non-standard ports.
avatar
Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
avatar
SlimKQL
2 months ago
100
Detects network requests originating from the Netch gateway tool or similar environments, attempting to fetch auto-configuration profiles for Shadowsocks from the external domain 'www.sheng886.top' using the '/api/v1/internal/shadowsocks/auto-config' endpoint. The rule specifically matches the Go-http-client user agent, which is common in automated scripts and Go-based proxy tools.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects an HTTP POST request targeting the host 'tt.yeyoujs.com' at the URI path '/api/agent/enroll', containing a specific Python aiohttp User-Agent string. This pattern is characteristic of a C2 agent attempting to register or enroll with an external command-and-control server.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (hidden window, encoded commands using char arrays, and iex) that subsequently initiates multiple or long-running network connections. This behavior is indicative of a remote access trojan, beaconing, or fileless malware downloading additional payloads.
avatar
Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
6026
Detects network connections from common Linux system binaries (agetty, atd, polkitd, crond) to identified suspicious external domains. These binaries typically do not communicate with external internet services, suggesting potential process masquerading or compromise.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects network activity communicating with Google Drive domains (drive.google.com and www.googleapis.com). This rule monitors outbound traffic, which may indicate the use of Google Drive as a command-and-control (C2) channel or for unauthorized data exfiltration.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects network connections from common Linux system binaries (agetty, atd, polkitd, crond) to identified suspicious external domains. These binaries typically do not communicate with external internet services, suggesting potential process masquerading or compromise.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
avatar
Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects the specific execution pattern associated with CurlRAT, where common Linux daemons (crond, atd, agetty, polkitd) perform an outbound network connection and subsequently spawn an interactive shell (sh, bash, dash) as the root user within a 5-minute window.
avatar
Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Page 91 of 190