Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections from common administrative processes (such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, or Rundll32) to known dynamic DNS providers. This pattern is frequently indicative of malware beacons, command and control (C2) communication, or other unauthorized remote access tools utilizing dynamic DNS services to maintain connectivity to adversary infrastructure.
Correlates DNS TXT-tunneling activity and HTTP POST traffic from the same host resolving to the same base destination domain within a 2-minute window, with minimum volume thresholds on each channel, consistent with malware that branches between DNS tunneling and HTTP POST C2 modes based on the first byte of a decrypted configuration string.
This rule identifies non-Microsoft processes (based on file name, file company name, and process signer) that initiate network connections to known Microsoft authentication endpoints. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary-controlled process attempting to leverage cloud services or perform authentication-related activities outside of expected system or productivity software.
Detects curl POSTing hardcoded username/password-style credentials to a /login endpoint on a known tunnel domain (ngrok, Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, or localhost.run), indicating credential submission to an attacker-exposed tunnel endpoint.
Detects a multi-hop HTTP redirect chain traversing two or more known OnyxC2 phishing lure domains from the same host within a two-minute window, consistent with the redirect obfuscation used before final payload delivery.
This one's the interesting bit they're using Ethereum RPC calls as a C2channel and dumping stolen secrets to attacker-owned public repos tagged "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again". Also flags Claude/VS Code config file writes dropped by the worm for lateral persistence across dev machines.
Detects POST requests to the Storm-2755 Payroll Pirates AiTM toolkit fingerprinting endpoint URI pattern co-occurring with the distinctive openresty/PHP response header combination.
Detects C2Looper v2 retrieving GitHub-hosted C2 tasking files (cmd.json, result.json, beacon.json) via raw.githubusercontent.com or api.github.com, requiring repeated requests to reduce false positives from incidental single fetches.
Detects HTTP requests to known UNC6671 AiTM reverse-proxy phishing kit IPs on MFA/OTP interception URI paths (push-tap, duo-push, oauth2 2fa, community verify), indicating live MFA bypass.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to domains and IP addresses identified as part of the LinX Coders infrastructure used for Mirage2FA adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing and credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) to non-Microsoft IP addresses on suspicious or high-range ports. This behavior often indicates compromised web servers being used for command-and-control (C2) communication, reconnaissance, or data exfiltration.
Detects curl liveness/health-check requests against a known tunnel domain issued repeatedly from a loop construct or a LaunchAgent/watchdog parent, indicating an automated watchdog keeping a reverse tunnel alive.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration via email by identifying mass near-identical background-image URLs in the body of an email. The rule looks for a high volume (8+) of distinct URLs that contain short parameters (indicative of encoded or smuggled data) within a single email. It further refines the detection by checking for the presence of specific CSS-like syntax often used in CSS-injection keylogging techniques to force the browser or email client to send background-image requests.
Detects malicious heartbeat check-ins to a C2 server endpoint '/api/bot/heartbeat' by monitoring for unauthorized exfiltration of hardware identifiers (Host/Device/HW ID) or potential remote task execution via Base64-encoded instructions in the response body, characteristic of ClickFix-related infostealer campaigns targeting macOS users.
Detects DNS/TLS SNI lookups for the hollowed wab.exe process's secondary C2 domains (bsc.rpc.blxrbdn.com, lb.propertyfind.cc) and the correlated follow-on connection to their resolved IPs, flagging the shared Cloudflare IP 172.67.161.234 for additional host-side process-lineage verification.
Detects a python3 script executed from /tmp under a zsh parent with command-line indicators of network activity (URLs, sockets, requests/urllib, curl/wget, or tunnel tool names), indicating a coding-agent-staged script establishing outbound network or tunnel connections.
Detects curl liveness/health-check requests against a known tunnel domain issued repeatedly from a loop construct or a LaunchAgent/watchdog parent, indicating an automated watchdog keeping a reverse tunnel alive.
Detects HTTP outbound traffic to domains using the .sbs TLD that follow a specific 'file' followed by dictionary words naming convention, associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule specifically identifies staging requests matching a /curl/<hex-id> URI pattern used to deliver secondary payloads.
Detects Shai-Hulud / ChainDrop activity by correlating known malicious hashes, npm/Node/Bun execution, payload artifacts, IDE persistence, credential discovery, cloud metadata access, GitHub exfiltration, C2 domains, Ethereum RPC activity, staging files, persistence artifacts, and known IOC IP connections.
Detects macOS infostealer malware using the curl utility to exfiltrate archived data (zip, tar, tgz, etc.) via multipart POST requests to specific known staging endpoints associated with the ClickFix campaign.
Detects outbound network connections and DNS queries to a maintained list of known UNC6671 extortion-related domain names. The rule utilizes a temporal 'recency' window (aged IOCs) to filter out stale indicators, mitigating false positives caused by sinkholed or reassigned infrastructure.
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