Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies non-Microsoft processes (based on file name, file company name, and process signer) that initiate network connections to known Microsoft authentication endpoints. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary-controlled process attempting to leverage cloud services or perform authentication-related activities outside of expected system or productivity software.
This rule detects suspicious outbound HTTP POST requests containing specific JSON fingerprint payloads associated with ClickFix campaigns. The fingerprint contains a mode set to 'php', typically delivered via hidden, auto-submitting forms on malicious domains to profile victims or deliver secondary payloads.
This rule detects outbound network traffic indicative of AI token jacking, where compromised API keys are utilized through unauthorized gray-market proxy platforms. It identifies requests originating from internal hosts using the specific, anomalous User-Agent string 'Go-http-client/2.0,gzip(gfe)' in conjunction with HTTP host headers associated with known AI 'transfer-station' services such as 'new-api' or 'one-api'. This signature is designed to distinguish malicious exploitation from benign Go-based service traffic, while explicitly excluding known internal service accounts to minimize false positives.
This one's the interesting bit they're using Ethereum RPC calls as a C2channel and dumping stolen secrets to attacker-owned public repos tagged "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again". Also flags Claude/VS Code config file writes dropped by the worm for lateral persistence across dev machines.
This rule detects network connections from common administrative processes (such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, or Rundll32) to known dynamic DNS providers. This pattern is frequently indicative of malware beacons, command and control (C2) communication, or other unauthorized remote access tools utilizing dynamic DNS services to maintain connectivity to adversary infrastructure.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration via email by identifying mass near-identical background-image URLs in the body of an email. The rule looks for a high volume (8+) of distinct URLs that contain short parameters (indicative of encoded or smuggled data) within a single email. It further refines the detection by checking for the presence of specific CSS-like syntax often used in CSS-injection keylogging techniques to force the browser or email client to send background-image requests.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) to non-Microsoft IP addresses on suspicious or high-range ports. This behavior often indicates compromised web servers being used for command-and-control (C2) communication, reconnaissance, or data exfiltration.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
This rule detects file creation and process execution events involving strings associated with the Solidity-Pro tool, which is known to be used as a C2 mechanism or malicious component. It specifically triggers on files with these patterns and processes spawned by or related to 'Code.exe' (VS Code) utilizing these malicious strings in their command lines.
Detects the malicious Open VSX "recon" extension variant checking whether its own extension ID is referenced in the workspace devcontainer.json or .vscode/extensions.json to determine if the install was configuration-driven versus human-initiated
Detects Microsoft Defender XDR UrlClickEvents where a clicked URL or extracted clicked domain matches known Coinbase Cartel-related URL, onion, messaging, or infrastructure indicators.
Detects HTTP network traffic containing the endpoint's local hostname transmitted within 30 seconds of a process starting, consistent with 'evil twin' Open VSX extensions that harvest developer environment metadata immediately upon activation.
Detects network connections to known Generative AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Mistral) from devices that have not exhibited such activity in the past 30 days. This rule excludes common browser processes and email/messaging clients to identify potentially anomalous or unapproved use of AI services.
Reverse Tunnel Traffic to localhost.run lhr.life Subdomain
Detects a code editor process (VS Code, VS Code Insiders, code-server) opening or reading the .git/config or .git/HEAD file, which may indicate a malicious editor extension harvesting private repository and CI/CD configuration data, as seen in the Open VSX "evil twin" extension campaign.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects network connections to known Generative AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Mistral) from devices that have not exhibited such activity in the past 30 days. This rule excludes common browser processes and email/messaging clients to identify potentially anomalous or unapproved use of AI services.
Detects a python3 script executed from /tmp under a zsh parent with command-line indicators of network activity (URLs, sockets, requests/urllib, curl/wget, or tunnel tool names), indicating a coding-agent-staged script establishing outbound network or tunnel connections.
Detects a process accessing .git/config or .git/HEAD files followed by a network connection or HTTP request from the same agent within a short time window, consistent with the Open VSX 'evil twin' extension campaign harvesting private repository and CI metadata and exfiltrating it to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects VS Code / Node.js processes associated with editor extensions making outbound HTTP requests that contain CI/CD environment variable names (e.g. GITHUB_REPOSITORY, CI_PROJECT_PATH, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, BUILDKITE, CODESPACES, GITPOD), consistent with the Open VSX 'evil twin' extension campaign that harvested private repository and CI/CD data from developer environments.
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