Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
34 detections
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KQL Query
KQL Query
KQL Query
This query visualises the total ammount of user false negative submission by submission type, including the phish simulations reported emails
This query visualises the amount of emails that had a post delivery action, summarizing the data daily by the final location as a result of the action
LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. First discovered in 2019, LemonDuck has since adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations in 2021. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.
This query checks for network connection failures to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint URLs.
The output includes any device with 1+ connectivity failures, a list of the domains they
failed to connect to (including the number of failures), as well as the overall number of
failures in the time period. Results are sorted by the total number of connection failures
by the device.
The output includes any device with 1+ connectivity failures, a list of the domains they
failed to connect to (including the number of failures), as well as the overall number of
failures in the time period. Results are sorted by the total number of connection failures
by the device.
'This query identifies matches based on domain IOCs related to KNOTWEED against Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device network connections'
The following analytic identifies the use of cleartext protocols that risk leaking sensitive information. It detects network traffic on legacy protocols such as Telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21). The detection leverages the Network_Traffic data model to identify TCP traffic on these ports. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can expose credentials and other sensitive data to interception. If confirmed malicious, attackers could capture authentication details, leading to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
This analytic detects a Windows application establishing an SMTP connection from a non-common installation path. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify processes not typically associated with email clients (e.g., Thunderbird, Outlook) making SMTP connections. This activity is significant as adversaries, including malware like AgentTesla, use such connections for Command and Control (C2) communication to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, including sensitive information like desktop screenshots, browser data, and system details, compromising the affected host.
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. This rule detects suspicious outbound SMTP connections by looking for connections to common SMTP ports (25, 587, 465, 2525) from processes that are not common mail client applications like Thunderbird or Outlook, or Microsoft Exchange Server processes.
This Yara rule detects the AgentRacoon backdoor, which is identified by specific bytecode patterns related to unpacking responses, file uploads, performing requests, retrieving DNS TXT records, and its main operational loop. The rule targets .NET (MSIL) executables, indicated by the 'uint16(0) == 0x5A4D' condition for MZ header and the nature of the bytecode patterns.
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