Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

18 detections

Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
25 days ago
001
Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
25 days ago
001
Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
25 days ago
000
Detects network activity associated with the DragonForce backdoor, specifically the use of MQTT for command and control. The rules monitor for unique 16-character client IDs used during registration on non-standard ports, subsequent command retrieval structures containing 'cmdnum', and DNS queries for the hardcoded broker 'broker.emqx.io'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
25 days ago
000
Detects outbound network traffic over MQTT ports (1883, 8883) to external networks, which may indicate command-and-control beaconing activity, specifically mimicking BambooToken-style behavior.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
001
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
000
Detects telemetry consistent with GigaWiper's command 8 'route manager' function, which binds or unbinds targeted routing keys against a RabbitMQ 'Topic' exchange using a mode of operation (1/2/3) to enable non-broadcast, targeted command delivery over AMQP C2 channels.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
000
Detects outbound network connections from workstations or servers to common message broker ports (MQTT 1883/8883, AMQP 5672). These protocols are sometimes abused for command-and-control (C2) communication, as they allow for pub/sub messaging patterns that can blend into legitimate network traffic.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
105
Detects outbound network connections from workstations or servers to common message broker ports (MQTT 1883/8883, AMQP 5672). These protocols are sometimes abused for command-and-control (C2) communication, as they allow for pub/sub messaging patterns that can blend into legitimate network traffic.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
004
Detects MQTT publish-subscribe protocol used as covert C2 channel
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects outbound network connections from workstations or servers to common message broker ports (MQTT 1883/8883, AMQP 5672). These protocols are sometimes abused for command-and-control (C2) communication, as they allow for pub/sub messaging patterns that can blend into legitimate network traffic.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
302
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication over the MQTT protocol. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 1883 (the standard MQTT port) from the home network to any destination. The detection is triggered by the presence of a specific byte sequence ('|10|') at the beginning of the payload, which corresponds to an MQTT PUBLISH message type. A threshold of 5 such messages within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives, indicating a sustained pattern of MQTT PUBLISH activity that could be indicative of C2.
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
006
This rule detects the use of MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) over TLS on port 8883, specifically identifying it as a potential encrypted Command and Control (C2) channel. It triggers an alert if there are at least 5 established TCP connections to port 8883 from a single source within a 60-second window, indicating persistent communication often associated with C2 activities.
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
005
This rule detects the use of AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing Protocol) on port 5672, specifically looking for the 'AMQP' content within the first 4 bytes of the TCP payload. It triggers an alert if this pattern is observed 5 times within 60 seconds from the same source IP, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity using AMQP as a communication channel.
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Darshan Thummar@Mighty
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Detections.ai Community
5 months ago
002
This rule detects suspicious network communication patterns indicative of command and control (C2) activity by analyzing the jitter (variability) in connection gaps and byte transfer sizes. It identifies connections with a high number of events, a consistent average gap between connections, and low jitter in both connection timing and data transfer sizes (bytes out and bytes in). This pattern can suggest automated, scheduled communication often associated with C2 channels.
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Ali AlEnezi@site
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
101315
KQL Query from file: Detecting TeamsPhisher attack with Azure Sentinel
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
8082
Today MDE Alerts do not show PUA/WDAV ThreatName. This is a demonstration of how to get, for example, PUA Threat Names.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0016