Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,235 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
734
214
105
78
51
Contributors
206
187
159
111
90
Categories
396
296
264
260
247
Platforms
492
314
281
204
110
Products / Services
379
234
152
109
106
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
1,235
CVEs
9
9
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
11
6
4
2
1
IDS Protocols
10
5
3
This rule monitors for successful sign-ins to sensitive cloud resources (such as Microsoft Authentication Broker, Office 365 Exchange Online, or Graph API) that originate from IP addresses not observed in the user's recent history (14-day baseline) or from known datacenter/hosting network ranges. The rule also filters for common scripted User-Agent strings (e.g., Python requests, curl) or empty User-Agent strings to increase the likelihood of detecting programmatic or malicious automated access rather than standard browser-based user activity.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
Detects anomalous data access or collection activity across multiple M365 workloads (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange). The rule identifies users exhibiting high volumes of file or mail access across at least two distinct workloads within a one-hour window, which may indicate account compromise, bulk data exfiltration, or unauthorized persistence via mailbox rules.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects network-based exploitation attempts against Dahua Easy4IP P2P relay infrastructure, including reconnaissance probes, unauthorized relay usage, and credential theft attempts via WSSE authentication.
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
Detects JFrog Artifactory access-token issuance events on/after the suspected compromise window (2026-08-28) where the token is tied to the anonymous identity, granted administrator scope, or has no attributable initiating user, per Fastly's remediation guidance.
Detects instances where the Grafana MCP (Model Context Protocol) server's service account identity executes administrative tools (such as 'grafana_api_request') within a session that lacks a verified, prior authentication event (bearer token). This pattern suggests an adversary may be spoofing or hijacking a privileged service account session to perform unauthorized administrative actions.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
Detects successful Azure AD sign-ins where the user agent identifies as a Python requests library version (2.33.1 or 2.34.2) that has not been observed for that specific user account in the preceding 14 days. This behavior is indicative of anomalous automated or scripted access.
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects the gitlab-triage automation tool being invoked with a personal access token scoped to the broad 'api' permission rather than a narrower issue/MR-only scope, inflating the blast radius if the token leaks.
Detects the gitlab-triage automation tool being invoked with a personal access token scoped to the broad 'api' permission rather than a narrower issue/MR-only scope, inflating the blast radius if the token leaks.
Detects the gitlab-triage automation tool being invoked with a personal access token scoped to the broad 'api' permission rather than a narrower issue/MR-only scope, inflating the blast radius if the token leaks.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects sessions using shared Grafana service account tokens that perform both read-only and action-capable tool operations without confirmed prior authentication. This behavior is indicative of an unauthenticated or spoofed session leveraging a service account's excessive permissions, bypassing standard authentication flows.
Detects sessions using shared Grafana service account tokens that perform both read-only and action-capable tool operations without confirmed prior authentication. This behavior is indicative of an unauthenticated or spoofed session leveraging a service account's excessive permissions, bypassing standard authentication flows.
Page 20 of 59