Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
104 detections
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Detects the use of the Windows 'net use' utility to mount a C$ administrative share using explicit user credentials. This behavior is commonly associated with lateral movement techniques where an adversary attempts to connect to a remote system share to gain access, transfer files, or execute binaries.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web App (OWA) by monitoring for a high volume of 401 Unauthorized status codes from non-internal IP addresses. It also correlates these authentication events with subsequent post-authentication actions, specifically identifying mailbox logins followed by mailbox searching or export requests, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized data collection or exfiltration.
Detects the execution of 'net.exe' from a 'powershell.exe' parent process to either reset the local administrator password or reactivate a built-in domain administrator account. This behavior is associated with the Akira ransomware group's pre-encryption stage to ensure access to compromised endpoints.
This rule monitors for successful and failed user authentication events (Logon events 4624 and 4625) occurring on Saturdays or Sundays. It calculates a risk score based on the volume of authentication attempts and classifies the activity, providing visibility into potential off-hours credential misuse or insider threat scenarios.
Detects Active Directory logons (Event IDs 4624, 4768, 4769) originating from the Fortinet SSL VPN IP pool. In the context of the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign, attackers utilize compromised Fortinet VPN credentials to immediately pivot into internal Active Directory environments. Because pure Sigma rules evaluate a single log source, this rule targets the Windows AD telemetry. To achieve the highest fidelity, this rule should be correlated in your SIEM with FortiGate SSL VPN tunnel-up events (e.g., Event Code 32130, 39424) originating from anomalous external IPs for the same principal within a short time window.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a network logon (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) followed by a successful Directory Replication Service (DRS) request (Event ID 4662, Access Mask 0x100) on a Domain Controller within a one-hour window. This pattern is indicative of potential lateral movement followed by credential dumping via DCSync, often associated with tools like Mimikatz.
This rule monitors for successful and failed user authentication events (Logon events 4624 and 4625) occurring on Saturdays or Sundays. It calculates a risk score based on the volume of authentication attempts and classifies the activity, providing visibility into potential off-hours credential misuse or insider threat scenarios.
Detects instances where a user account is created or modified (e.g., added to a local admin group) shortly after a network logon event (Logon Type 3 or 10). This behavioral correlation is highly indicative of lateral movement followed by local privilege escalation or persistence establishment.
This rule detects potential brute force attacks against Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web App (OWA) by monitoring for a high volume of 401 Unauthorized status codes from non-internal IP addresses. It also correlates these authentication events with subsequent post-authentication actions, specifically identifying mailbox logins followed by mailbox searching or export requests, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized data collection or exfiltration.
Detects high-frequency SMB (Logon Type 3) authentication events targeting Domain Controllers, specifically involving suspicious or generic accounts such as 'ANONYMOUS LOGON', 'Guest', empty usernames, or machine accounts. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance, session enumeration, or brute-force attempts targeting the domain.
Detects the creation of domain accounts named 'backup_DA' or 'backup_EA' and the subsequent addition of the 'backup_EA' account to the 'Enterprise Admins' group. This behavior is associated with the persistence and privilege escalation tactics used by the Akira ransomware group.
Detects high-frequency SMB (Logon Type 3) authentication events targeting Domain Controllers, specifically involving suspicious or generic accounts such as 'ANONYMOUS LOGON', 'Guest', empty usernames, or machine accounts. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance, session enumeration, or brute-force attempts targeting the domain.
This rule detects the execution of 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' by 'powershell.exe' to perform potentially malicious Active Directory administrative tasks. Specifically, it monitors for commands related to creating or modifying domain users, adding users to privileged groups such as 'Enterprise Admins', or configuring backup accounts, which are common patterns for persistence and privilege escalation.
This rule detects the execution of 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' by 'powershell.exe' to perform potentially malicious Active Directory administrative tasks. Specifically, it monitors for commands related to creating or modifying domain users, adding users to privileged groups such as 'Enterprise Admins', or configuring backup accounts, which are common patterns for persistence and privilege escalation.
Detects successful user sign-ins from a country that has not been observed in the user's sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This baseline helps identify potentially compromised accounts by surfacing geographic anomalies.
Detects successful remote logons (LogonType 3 or 10) to Windows systems using highly privileged accounts (admin, administrator, root, or service-specific accounts) where the source IP address is external to defined private network CIDR ranges. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized access or compromised credentials.
Detects automated lateral movement attempts using sshpass to perform password spraying or authentication against PeopleSoft-related service accounts (psoft, oracle, linuxadm). The rule specifically flags the use of sshpass with lax security settings (StrictHostKeyChecking=no), identifying a pattern associated with the uon_fanout.sh post-exploitation script.
Detects anomalous activities associated with the Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability. The rule identifies suspicious machine account password changes, NTLM authentication from potentially untrusted subnets or unconfigured workstations, and privilege escalation indicators occurring on domain controllers.
Detects successful user sign-ins from a country that has not been observed in the user's sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This baseline helps identify potentially compromised accounts by surfacing geographic anomalies.
Detects anomalous access to Privileged Access Management (PAM) platforms (e.g., CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea, HashiCorp Vault, Thycotic, ARCON PAM). The rule identifies successful sign-ins occurring outside typical business hours (7 AM to 7 PM) that also exhibit either a high volume of sign-ins (more than 5 per hour per user/app) or access from multiple new IP addresses (more than 2 unique IPs per hour per user/app). This behavior is indicative of potential abuse of privileged accounts, possibly by threat actors like Silk Typhoon (HAFNIUM).
This rule detects network traffic indicative of a domain account being used for lateral movement via SMB. It specifically looks for NTLMSSP authentication within SMB traffic directed to port 445 on the home network, containing the string 'domain' (case-insensitive). A threshold of 10 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, suggesting a potential brute-force or rapid access attempt.
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