Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).
Detects attempts to enable the root account via "dsenableroot"
Detects attempts to create and add an account to the admin group via "dscl"
Detects attempts to create and/or add an account to the admin group, thus granting admin privileges.
Detects attempts to create and add an account to the admin group via "sysadminctl"
This rule detects potential indicators of compromise related to CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN systems. It focuses on two main areas: 1) suspicious successful SSH authentications for the 'vmanage-admin' account, and 2) SD-WAN control plane connection events indicating a new 'up' state. The first part looks for specific log entries related to publickey authentication for 'vmanage-admin' from any source IP. The second part identifies control connection state changes to 'up' and extracts peer type, peer system IP, and public IP from the raw logs. The rule aims to surface events that require human confirmation by comparing them against known network designs and change records, as these events can indicate unexpected relationships between devices or unauthorized privileged access.
Detects attempts to exploit an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Inetutils Telnet daemon. Attackers inject the '-f' flag into the 'USER' environment variable during Telnet negotiation to gain unauthorized shell access.
This rule detects suspicious activity where an Azure CLI session, initially interactive, is followed by non-interactive access from a different IP address. This could indicate an attacker using a stolen token or session from a legitimate user's interactive login to perform automated actions. The rule specifically looks for a pivot from interactive to non-interactive access where the non-interactive access occurs after the interactive access and from a different IP address, within a 30-day lookback window.
Detects attempts to exploit a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2025-64446) in FortiWeb. Attackers send a crafted POST request to create a new administrative user by targeting a specific URI and including keywords in the request body indicative of new admin creation.
Detects any authentication activity (successful or failed) for emergency break-glass administrative accounts
This rule detects when a user is added to the local 'admin' group on a macOS system using either the `dscl` or `dseditgroup` command-line utilities. It specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of adding a user to the 'admin' group. There is a whitelist for legitimate MDM solutions like 'jamfmanager' to reduce false positives.
This rule detects successful remote logons by users whose usernames start with 'Admin' (e.g., Administrator, Admin-SQL) on Windows systems. It specifically looks for Event ID 4624 (successful logon), Logon Type 10 (RemoteInteractive), and the Negotiate authentication package. The rule aims to identify potential misuse of administrative accounts for remote access, which could indicate privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement. Its effectiveness relies on an internal pattern for administrator usernames and a policy mandating that these accounts are only used as secondary accounts.
Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges.
This rule detects attempts to add a user to the 'admin' group on macOS systems using the `dscl` command-line utility. Specifically, it looks for `dscl` commands that include the `-append` option, target the `/Groups/admin` path, and modify `GroupMembership`. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation or persistence by granting administrative rights to a standard user account.
Detects attempts to enable the root account on macOS systems using the 'dsenableroot' command-line utility. This action can be used for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion by adversaries.
Detects attempts to create and add an account to the admin group via the `sysadminctl` utility on macOS. This action can be used for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion by creating a new administrative user.
Detects attempts to add a user account to the 'admin' group on macOS using the `dseditgroup` utility, which grants administrative privileges to the added user. This action can be used for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion by an attacker.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets from the 'Microsoft.PowerShell.LocalAccounts' module, which are used to manipulate local user accounts. This includes actions such as disabling, enabling, getting information about, setting properties of, creating, renaming, and removing local users. Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems, modify credentials, or change permission groups.
This rule detects suspicious failed logon attempts by monitoring specific uncommon error codes. These error codes indicate issues such as logons to disabled accounts, attempts outside authorized hours, from unauthorized workstations, or due to trust relationship failures or insufficient logon rights. Such failures can suggest an adversary attempting to bypass security controls or test account validity and permissions.
The following analytic identifies instances where users may have mistakenly entered their passwords in the username field during authentication attempts. It detects this by analyzing failed authentication events with usernames longer than 7 characters and high Shannon entropy, followed by a successful authentication from the same source to the same destination. This activity is significant as it can indicate potential security risks, such as password exposure. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to gain unauthorized access, leading to potential data breaches or further compromise of the system.
This rule audits the state of service accounts in the environment by counting total, enabled, and disabled service accounts. This helps in identifying unused or stale service accounts, ensuring only necessary service accounts are active to reduce the attack surface, and supporting compliance and security posture assessments.
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