Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user account performs non-interactive or legacy authentication (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP, ActiveSync) shortly after an endpoint associated with that same user is flagged for malware or infostealer activity. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using exfiltrated credentials to maintain access to cloud services while bypassing MFA policies.
Detects the assignment of a highly privileged administrative or directory role to a user or service principal following a high-risk or anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential session hijacking where an adversary attempts to escalate privileges within a cloud environment after gaining initial access to a compromised account.
This rule detects anomalous Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or Just-in-Time (JIT) role activation events. It identifies when a user activates a privileged role following suspicious activity such as a risky sign-in, during unusual (off-hours) time windows, or from an unfamiliar source IP address, potentially indicating session hijacking or credential abuse.
Detects sign-in events to high-privileged cloud management consoles (e.g., Azure Portal, Microsoft Entra, Intune, Okta, AWS, GCP) originating from sessions with elevated risk or anomalous characteristics. The detection monitors for factors such as the use of anonymized IP addresses, unmanaged devices, sessions marked as 'atRisk' by identity providers, or non-interactive service-based access to management APIs that deviate from standard administrative workflow patterns.
This rule detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell environment or session where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not explicitly recorded in the event data. Unauthorized access to CloudShell can provide an adversary with a command-line interface to interact with AWS APIs, potentially facilitating further malicious activities.
Detects potential privilege escalation where an identity with iam:PassRole permissions deploys or updates compute resources (CloudFormation, EC2, or Lambda) to assume a more privileged IAM role than the user currently holds.
Detects potential privilege escalation where an identity with iam:PassRole permissions deploys or updates compute resources (CloudFormation, EC2, or Lambda) to assume a more privileged IAM role than the user currently holds.
Detects anomalous Entra ID sign-in patterns indicating potential session hijacking or stolen session cookie replay. The rule identifies pairs of successful sign-ins where the geographic distance and time elapsed suggest impossible travel, or where the device/browser context changes without a fresh MFA challenge, suggesting the bypass of authentication requirements via persistent session tokens.
Detects successful authentication attempts using legacy protocols or non-interactive refresh tokens for user accounts previously flagged within a 14-day window as being involved in infostealer or credential exposure events.
This rule detects potential session hijacking by monitoring for the reuse of session or refresh tokens from unrecognized devices, browsers, or user agents, particularly when such activity occurs without an interactive MFA challenge. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to use stolen session cookies or tokens to access cloud resources.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events where the user-agent matches common scripting or automation libraries such as python-requests. This behavior is often indicative of automated token replay attacks, where attackers attempt to leverage stolen session cookies or tokens (e.g., following AiTM phishing) via proxy infrastructure.
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects AWS CloudTrail and Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) privilege-escalation actions (e.g., attaching policies, creating access keys, adding roles) performed by principals from rare source IPs or associated with low-frequency administrative actions, indicating potentially compromised or unauthorized account activity.
Detects when the Google Cloud Config Connector (KCC) service account is granted highly privileged roles (roles/owner or roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin) at the Organization scope. This pattern is indicative of a potential 'ConfigConfusion' confused-deputy attack, where a compromised Kubernetes namespace with IAMPolicyMember creation rights could be used to escalate privileges to Organization Owner.
Detects potential AWS IAM privilege escalation attempts by identifying suspicious modifications to IAM policies, roles, or trust relationships, as well as unauthorized role assumption events. This rule monitors for activities such as attaching high-privilege policies (e.g., AdministratorAccess), creating new policy versions, and modifying trust policies to allow unexpected principals, which are common indicators of post-compromise activity designed to expand access within an AWS environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a suspected account takeover pattern where an Azure AD account logs into the Azure Portal shortly after experiencing failed authentication attempts from the same IP address. The detection correlates password spraying or VPN probing activity (multiple failed logins against different users from a single IP) with subsequent successful or near-successful logins (MFA enrollment interrupts) on the Azure Portal, signaling potential post-compromise activity.
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