Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a namespace-scoped identity creates, updates, or patches AWS or Azure IAM-related custom resources in Kubernetes. This pattern monitors for a 'confused deputy' scenario where a user might attempt to leverage high-privilege cloud operators (like ACK or ASO v2) that operate with a shared high-privilege identity to modify cloud IAM configurations.
Detects when a namespace-scoped identity creates, updates, or patches AWS or Azure IAM-related custom resources in Kubernetes. This pattern monitors for a 'confused deputy' scenario where a user might attempt to leverage high-privilege cloud operators (like ACK or ASO v2) that operate with a shared high-privilege identity to modify cloud IAM configurations.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects modifications or creations of Azure DevOps pipelines and service connections, as well as pipeline executions performed outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM on weekdays). This activity is intended to identify potential unauthorized infrastructure or pipeline configuration changes that could indicate persistence or lateral movement via CI/CD pipelines.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful user login from an IP address not previously seen for that specific user in the last 14 days, followed immediately (within 1 hour) by sensitive administrative operations performed by the same user, such as adding members to roles or modifying application permissions.
Detects modifications or creations of Azure DevOps pipelines and service connections, as well as pipeline executions performed outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM on weekdays). This activity is intended to identify potential unauthorized infrastructure or pipeline configuration changes that could indicate persistence or lateral movement via CI/CD pipelines.
Detects successful authentication attempts in Azure AD or Microsoft 365 logs originating from known proxy/VPN service providers or identified by suspicious Python-requests user agent strings. The rule specifically filters for events where MFA was not satisfied, indicating potentially bypassed or failed security controls from potentially malicious infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
This rule identifies sign-in events using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that occur within the 2-day cache window immediately following a certificate or key credential update for an application or service principal in Entra ID. This detection highlights a timeframe where an attacker potentially possessing a compromised old signing key could use it to forge tokens before the Entra cache refreshes.
Detects potential session hijacking where a user logs into Google Workspace from a new IP or country, followed within an hour by the registration of a new security key or passkey, which is a common technique to establish persistent unauthorized access.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device enrollment, and subsequently continues to access cloud services (Microsoft Graph, Exchange Online, Intune) shortly after their account password has been reset. This pattern is indicative of persistent access maintained via a registered device or OAuth token that survives credential remediation.
Detects Azure AD/Entra ID authentication events where a session token or cookie is used without performing a fresh interactive MFA challenge, which is characteristic of session hijacking or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) relay attacks (e.g., NovaCookies) used to bypass security controls after initial authentication.
Detects session hijacking (AiTM) attempts where a failed or interrupted sign-in (ResultType 50199) is followed by a successful login using the same SessionId but with an Axios user-agent, indicating automated replay of a stolen session token rather than legitimate browser usage.
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
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